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I.

INTRODUCTION

Court decisions finding federal preemption of state statutes of
repose risk violating the principle of Chesterton's fence. According
to the principle, one should not take down a "fence" without full
appreciation of the reason why it was put up in the first place. 1 G.K.
Chesterton himself described it this way:
"In the matter of reforming things, as distinct from
deforming them, there is one plain and simple principle; a
principle which will probably be called a paradox. There
exists in such a case a certain institution or law; let us say,
for the sake of simplicity, a fence or gate erected across a
road. The more modem type of reformer goes gaily up to it
and says, "I don't see the use of this; let us clear it away."
To which the more intelligent type of reformer will do well
to answer: "If you don't see the use of it, I certainly won't
let you clear it away. Go away and think. Then, when you
can come back and tell me that you do see the use of it, I
may allow you to destroy it."2

1.

See G.K. CHESTERTON, THE THING 35-36 (1957). The fourteenth edition of Bartlett's

2.

Familiar Quotations includes the saying, "Don't ever take a fence down until you
know why it was put up," and notes that it was "[a]scribed to Chesterton by John F.
Kennedy in a 1945 notebook." JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 919 (Emily
Morison Beck ed., 14th ed. 1968). For examples of courts citing the principle, see
Stickler v. Halevy, 794 F. Supp. 2d 385, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); McKinney v. Hanks,
911 F. Supp. 359, 360--61 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
CHESTERTON, supra note 1, at 35. Chesterton elaborated:
This paradox rests on the most elementary common sense. The
gate or fence did not grow there ... Some person had some reason
for thinking it would be a good thing for somebody. And until we
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Statutes of repose are fences on the time continuum that can prevent
causes of actions from arising or being enforced after a given period
of time has elapsed from a defined event. In recent years, courts
applying the doctrine of federal preemption have increasingly found
that federal statutes removed the barriers of state statutes of repose to
certain tort suits. 3 In doing so, however, courts have not followed a
consistent interpretive approach to determine whether Congress
meant to tear down the statute of repose "fence" through careful
consideration of congressional intent and an understanding of the
nature of the fence and the purposes of the state legislature in erecting
it.
This article proposes an interpretative framework for determining
questions of federal preemption of state statutes of repose that gives
due consideration to both the preemptive power of the federal
government through the Supremacy Clause as well as the
prerogatives of the state legislature to define the limits of a state's
causes of action. First, the article considers the nature of statutes of
repose, particularly how they have developed as substantive rather
than procedural components of state law, which has important
implications for determining questions of federal preemption.4
Second, the article discusses the different doctrines of federal
preemption-express preemption, field preemption, and conflict
preemption-considering application of each doctrine to questions of
federal preemption of state statutes of repose. 5 Third, the article
explores how principles of statutory interpretation determine the
preemptive reach of a federal statute, focusing on text-based
principles, interpretive canons of construction and legislative history. 6
know what the reason was, we really cannot judge whether the
reason was reasonable ... But the truth is that nobody has any
business to destroy a social institution until he has really seen it as
an historical institution. If he knows how it arose, and what
purposes it was supposed to serve, he may really be able to say
that they were bad purposes, or that they have since become bad
purposes, or that they are purposes which are no longer served.
But if he simply stares at the thing as a senseless monstrosity that
has somehow sprung up in his path, it is he and not the
traditionalist who is suffering from an illusion.

3.
4.

5.
6.

!d. at 35-36. See generally Dale Alquist, G.K. Chesterton's Uncommonly Sensible
Views on the Law, 3 AVE MARlA L. REv. 685 (2005) (discussing how Chesterton may
have viewed the modern legal system).
See infra Parts V, VI.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.

2014]

Federal Law and State Statutes of Repose

123

With this background, the article proposes an interpretive approach
which is faithful to Chesterton's principle, striking an appropriate
balance between federal and state power through determining the
considered intent of Congress to strike down state statutes of repose
or leave them standing. 7 The key is congressional intent, and the
article will briefly discuss the appropriate goal of the interpretive
process before outlining the interpretive approach. 8
Through the Supremacy Clause,9 Congress clearly has the
constitutional power to preempt state statutes of repose, but the
central question in every case will be whether Congress intended to
do so. 10 The first inquiry in the interpretive analysis must be whether
the plain meaning of the text of the statute reflects congressional
intent to preempt state statutes of repose. 11 If there is a preemption
provision in the statute then, under principles of express preemption,
courts must give effect to the plain meaning of the provision. 12 As
we will see, however, an express preemption provision may not be
clear regarding whether it applies to state statutes of repose. 13 If there
is ambiguity, the next step is to consider whether meaning can be
determined through application of "text-based" canons of
interpretation. 14
If not, the court should consider whether
"substantive" canons of construction can give rise to any presumption
regarding preemption. 15 A court should determine the aptness of any
potentially applicable substantive canon of construction to the
particular federal statute at issue; the analysis must recognize both the
purposes of the federal provision and the nature of state power
exercised through the statute of repose. 16 The article will discuss how
a court should determine whether any presumption regarding
preemption should apply when multiple substantive canons provide
different indications of meaning. 17
7.
8.
9.
10.

II.
12.

13.
14.
15.
16.
I 7.

See infra Part IV.E.
See infra Part IV.A.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,485-86 (1996) (stating that congressional
intent is the "ultimate touchstone" for determining whether a federal statute preempts
state law).
See infra Part IV.B.
See, e.g., Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 474 (9th Cir. 2007); Peters v.
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 80 F.3d 257, 261 (8th Cir. 1996).
See infra Part V.A.l.
See infra Part IV.C.l.
See infra Part IV.C.2.
See infra Part IV.C.2.
See infra Part IV.C.2.
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Once a court has determined whether there should be a
presumption for or against preemption, the final step is to determine
whether the presumption is overcome by examining the statutory
context, the legislative history, and the purposes of the federal
statute. 18 This last step in the interpretive analysis incorporates
principles of field preemption and conflict preemption in considering
statutory context. 19
Finally, the last two sections of the article apply the interpretive
approach to two ongoing conflicts in federal law regarding whether a
particular federal statute preempts state statutes of repose. 20 One
statute, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA)/ 1 includes an express preemption
provision; 22 the other statute, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)/ 3
does not. The analysis of these conflicts shows how an objective
application of an interpretive approach can best determine the
considered intent of Congress.

18.
19.
20.
21.

22.

23.

See infra Part IV.D.
See infra Part IV.D.
See generally infra Parts V, VI (discussing matters of preemption between federal and
state laws).
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-510,94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of26 and
42 U.S.C.).
42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(l) (2006). This particular provision was added to CERCLA by
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), which refined and
expanded CERCLA. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 26,
and 42 U.S.C.).
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (2006); see Augutis v. United States, 732 F.3d 749,
754 (7th Cir. 2013) ("The FTCA does not expressly preempt state statutes of repose,
nor does it impliedly preempt state substantive law; to the contrary, it expressly
incorporates it.").

2014]

Federal Law and State Statutes of Repose

125

II.

CONSIDERING THE NATURE AND PURPOSES OF STATE
STATUTES OF REPOSE

A.

Distinguishing Statutes ofRepose from Statutes ofLimitations

Statutes of repose are distinct from statutes of limitations. 24 A
statute of limitations is a procedural defense to a legal claim. 25 It
provides a period of time from the date that a claim accrues during
which a claimant must take some action to prosecute the claim. 26 A
claimant's failure to take action within the statutory period usually
provides an affirmative defense to the cause of action. 27 By contrast,
a statute of repose is a substantive right to be free from liability after
a given period of time has elapsed from a defmed event.28
Significantly, the triggering event that starts the limitations period is
not the accrual of the cause of action for the claimant, but rather some
other defined event, which is usually conduct of the defendant that is
related to the claim. 29 A statute of repose will entirely extinguish a
cause of action after the passage of time even if the cause of action
has not yet accrued. 30
24.

25.

26.
27.
28.
29.

30.

Ma v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 597 F.3d 84, 88 n.4 (2d Cir.
2010); Moore v. Liberty Nat' I Life Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 1209, 1217-18 (11th Cir. 2001);
Hinkle ex ref. Hinkle, 85 F.3d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1996); Dunn v. Dunn, 281 P.3d 540,
548 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012). See generally 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 4
(20 11) ("Statutes of limitation are fundamentally or materially different from statutes
of repose .... "); Josephine Herring Hicks, Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes of
Repose: Federalism Reigns, 38 VAND. L. REv. 627, 628-29 (1985) ("[I]mportant
differences exist between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose.").
Hinkle, 85 F.3d at 301; First United Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. U.S. Gypsum
Co., 882 F.2d 862, 865 (4th Cir. 1989); Dunn, 281 P.3d at 548; see 51 AM. JUR. 2o,
supra note 24, § 4.
Moore, 267 F.3d at 1218; Hicks, supra note 24, at 629.
Ma, 597 F.3d at 88 n.4; Roskam Baking Co. v. Lanham Mach. Co., 288 F.3d 895,
902-03 (6th Cir. 2002).
Hinkle, 85 F.3d at 301; First United Methodist Church, 882 F.2d at 866; Dunn, 281
P.3d at 548.
Ma, 597 F.3d at 88 n.4; Moore, 267 F.3d at 1218; see also Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d
1030, 1048 (9th Cir. 2013) (en bane) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("[A statute
of repose] is a fixed, statutory cutoff date, usually independent of any variable, such
as claimant's awareness of a violation."); Roskam Baking Co., 288 F.3d at 903 ("A
statute of limitations focuses on time measured from an injury; a statute of repose
rests on the time from some initiating event unrelated to an injury."); 51 AM. JUR. 2o,
supra note 24, § 4 ("A statute of repose limits the time within which an action may be
brought, but is not related to the accrual of the cause of action.").
See, e.g., Wong, 732 F.3d at 1048; Ma, 597 F.3d at 88 n.4; Dunn, 281 P.3d at 548;
Hicks, supra note 24, at 628-29.
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The terms "statute of limitations" and "statute of repose" developed
as clearly distinct concepts only during the second half of the
twentieth century in response to the incorporation of a "discovery
rule of accrual" into statutes of limitations. Under a typical discovery
rule of accrual for a tort action, a cause of action "accrues," starting
the statute of limitations period running, only when the claimant
knows, or has reason to know, of an injury and its cause. 31 The
justification for a discovery rule of accrual lies in the perceived
unfairness to a claimant of starting the statute of limitations at an
earlier time, when a claimant may be "blameless[ly] ignorant" of the
"unknown and inherently unknowable" existence of an injury. 32
During the early twentieth century, most states recognized a
discovery rule only in the limited circumstances of fraud or
concealment. 33 In the absence of fraud or concealment, the general
rule was that the cause of action "accrued" at the time the right of
action first arose, even though the claimant had no knowledge of the
right to sue, or the facts out of which the right arose. 34 But, in 1949,
in Urie v. Thompson, the Supreme Court incorporated a "general
31.

32.

33.

34.

See, e.g., Litif v. United States, 670 F.3d 39, 43-44 (1st Cir. 2012); A.Q.C. ex rei.
Castillo v. United States, 656 F.3d 135, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Merck & Co.
v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 646 (2010) ("[T]reatise writers now describe 'the
discovery rule' as allowing a claim 'to accrue when the litigant first knows or with
due diligence should know facts that will form the basis for an action."' (emphasis
added) (quoting 2 CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS, § 11.1.1, at 134
(1991))).
Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169-71 (1949) (stating that prior to diagnosis, the
plaintiffs disease was "unknown and inherently unknowable" and Congress could not
have intended that the plaintiffs action be barred by the statute in the face of
"blameless ignorance").
See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 899 cmt. e (1939) ("[l]t is still true in many of the
States that, in the absence of fraud or concealment of the cause of action, the statutory
period runs from the time the tort was committed although the injured person had no
knowledge or reason to know of it.").
See 2 H.G. WOOD, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 276c(l), at 1408-10 (4th ed. 1916)
("Mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does not prevent the running of
the statute of limitations unless there has been fraudulent concealment on the part of
those invoking the benefit of the statute."); 17 RULING CASE LAW, Limitation of
Actions § 193, at 831 (William M. McKinney & Burdett A. Rich eds., 1917) ("The
fact that a person entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue, or of the
facts out of which his right arises, does not, as a general rule, prevent the running of
the statute, or postpone the commencement of the period of limitation, until he
discovers the facts or learns of his rights thereunder."); see also Adam Bain & Ugo
Colella, Interpreting Federal Statutes of Limitations, 3 7 CREIGHTON L. REv. 493, 513
(2004) (showing that law dictionaries in the twentieth century did not include a
discovery component in the definition of the word "accrue" as it related to statutes of
limitations until the 1979 edition of Black's Law Dictionary).
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discovery rule" of accrual into the statute of limitations of the Federal
Employers Liability Act (FELA), holding that a plaintiff's cause of
action did not accrue until the plaintiff knew, or should have known,
of the injury. 35 The Court found that barring a claim of a plaintiff
who had been unaware of an injury caused by exposure to silica dust
many years prior to a diagnosis of silicosis could not be consistent
with FELA's "humane legislative plan" or reconciled with "the
traditional purposes of statutes of limitations, which conventionally
require the assertion of claims within a specified period of time after
the notice of the invasion of legal rights." 36 In 1950, an influential
article in the Harvard Law Review recognized the traditional,
"convenient rule" that a plaintiff's inability to discover an injury, or
other facts supporting a cause of action, was irrelevant to the
commencement of the statute of limitations period; but, the article
recommended an exception to this rule in "situations where the
plaintiff is generally unlikely to learn of the harm before the remedy
expires.'m By 1979, the second Restatement of Torts recognized that
a "wave of recent decisions" had held that a statute of limitations
"must be construed as not intended to start to run until the plaintiff
has in fact discovered the fact that he has suffered injury or by the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered it.''38 This
represented a significant change in limitations law, particularly with
respect to latent injuries. Under this new discovery rule of accrual, as
long as a putative plaintiff did not know or have reason to know of an
injury, the statute of limitations did not begin to run and the cause of
action was not time-barred no matter how long in the past the injury
may have occurred. 39

35.
36.
37.
38.

39.

See Urie, 337 U.S. at 169-71.
!d. at 170.
Note, Developments in the Law- Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177,
1203 (1950).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 899 cmt. e (1979); see also SUPERFUND SECTION
30l(E) STUDY GRP., 97TH CONG., INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAzARDOUS
WASTES-ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES, at 28-30, 118-19 n.4,
app. Bat B-1 to B-40 (Comm. Print 1982) (fmding that by the early 1980s, thirty-nine
jurisdictions had adopted a discovery rule of accrual for personal injury actions);
CORMAN, supra note 31, § 11.1.1, at 134 (noting that the "potential harshness" of
beginning the statute of limitations when a "judicially recognizable injury" or "breach
of duty" occurred was mitigated by the judicial development of a discovery rule).
See Susan D. Glimcher, Note, Statutes ofLimitations and the Discovery Rule in Latent
Injury Claims: An Exception or the Law, 43 U. PITT. L. REv. 501, 501-03 (1981).
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Appreciating the Intended Purposes of Statutes of Repose

The incorporation of a discovery rule of accrual into state statutes
of limitations created what was termed a "long tail" effect of
potential liability for defendants for conduct that occurred in the
distant past. 40 This effect reduced the ability of insurance companies
to predict future liabilities, which resulted in a perceived insurance
crisis because insurance companies were reluctant to write certain
policies or, alternatively, required very high premiums for the
policies. 41 Recognizing this, and the resulting rise in insurance costs
to businesses, state legislatures began to enact "statutes of repose" to
provide a fmite time limit on defendants' potential liability.42 Such
statutes of repose exist in over half of the states and reflect a state
legislature's conclusion that, after a certain point in time, a potential
defendant should be immune from tort liability for past conduct
despite the possibility that an individual may later become aware of
some harm arising out of the conduct. 43
40.

41.

42.

43.

See, e.g., Hinkle ex rei. Hinkle v. Henderson, 85 F.3d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1996); Katz
v. Children's Hosp. of Orange Cnty., 28 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1994); Mohamed v.
Donald J. Nolan, Ltd., No. 12-CV-3139 (NGG)(JMA), 2013 WL 4807612, at *8
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013).
See, e.g., Hinkle, 85 F.3d at 301; Katz, 28 F.3d at 1525; see also Nancy E. Leibowitz,
Case Note, Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 501 A.2d 27 (1985), 16 U. BALT. L. REv.
571, 574-75 (1987) (discussing the argument that the discovery rule expanded the
number of potential tort plaintiffs and removed the "definite period in which liability
can be predicted" so that insurance companies were "unable to set affordable and
adequate insurance premiums").
See, e.g., Hinkle, 85 F.3d at 301. State courts frequently recognized that statutes of
repose were a response to the open-ended liability created by a discovery rule of
accrual. See, e.g., Comstock v. Collier, 737 P.2d 845, 849 (Colo. 1987) (en bane);
Orlak v. Loyola Univ. Health Sys., 885 N.E.2d 999, 1003-04 (Ill. 2007); Joslyn v.
Chang, 837 N.E.2d 1107, 1110 (Mass. 2005); Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 699500, 501 A.2d 27, 32 (1985); Givens v. Anchor Packing, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 771, 77375 (Neb. 1991); Hoffman v. Powell, 380 S.E.2d 821, 822 (S.C. 1989); see also Gail
D. Eiesland, Miller v. Gilmore: The Constitutionality of South Dakota's Medical
Malpractice Statute of Limitations, 38 S.D. L. REv. 672, 685-86 (1993) (stating that
statutes of repose were enacted in response to the insurance crisis thought to be
created by the discovery rule); Hicks, supra note 24, at 632 ("[The] most noted
justification for statutes of repose is the desire to alleviate the insurance problem
facing manufacturers, the medical profession, and the construction industry. . . .
[A]bnormally long periods of potential liability [or the] ... 'long tail' problem is the
principal culprit . . . . "); Leibowitz, supra note 41, at 574-75 (stating that state
legislatures enacted statutes of repose in response to the "long tail" effect of the
discovery rule).
See, e.g., Daily v. New Britain Mach. Co., 512 A.2d 893, 904 (Conn. 1986); Albrecht
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 648 N.W.2d 87, 91 (Iowa 2002); Farber v. Lok-N-Logs, Inc.,
701 N.W.2d 368, 377 (Neb. 2005); Friends of Clark Mountain Found., Inc. v. Bd. of
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Setting an absolute time period of potential liability as measured
from the date of a defendant's conduct could "significantly reduce the
uncertainty associated with the 'long tail' effect of the discovery
rule," theoretically permitting insurance companies to underwrite
risks that were previously too open-ended and to lower premiums. 44
State legislatures targeted statutes of repose to certain types of tort
actions, such as medical malpractice actions, 45 actions against
architects, 46 and product liability actions,47 perceiving that more
certainty regarding liability in those areas was necessary. 48 Some
state legislatures also enacted statutes of repose that applied to
personal injury and property damage actions generally. 49 While there
has been debate regarding whether the discovery rule was responsible
for the "insurance crisis,"50 states have not repealed their statutes of
repose based on a policy decision that they were unnecessary or
ineffective in controlling insurance costs. As long as the states have
statutes of repose, physicians, architects, manufacturers, and other
defendants-as well as their insurers-will assume that an applicable
statute of repose provides an absolute time barrier to actions based on
covered conduct.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.
49.
50.

Supervisors of Orange Cnty., 406 S.E.2d 19, 21 (Va. 1991); Kohn v. Darlington
Cmty. Sch., 698 N.W.2d 794, 806 (Wis. 2005); Bell v. Schell, 101 P.3d 465, 472
(Wyo. 2004).
Thaddeus Mason Pope, Physicians and Safe Harbor Legal Immunity, 21 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 121, 130 (2012); see also Hicks, supra note 24, at 632-33 ("[S]tatutes of
repose lead to more certain liability and thus provide greater actuarial precision in
setting insurance rates.").
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4)(b) (West 2002 & Supp. 2014); GA. CODE ANN.§
9-3-7l(b) (2007 & Supp. 2013); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.513(a) (West 1999
& Supp. 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-116(a)(3) (2012 & Supp. 2013); UTAH
CODE ANN.§ 788-3-404(1) (LexisNexis 2012).
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-22l(a) (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2013); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (West 2013); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-214(b) (West
2011); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:l4-l.l(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2013).
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.031(2)(b) (West 2002 & Supp. 2014); IOWA CODE
ANN.§ 614.1(2A) (West 1999 & Supp. 2013); OR. REv. STAT.§ 30.905 (2013); TENN.
CODE ANN.§ 29-28-103(a) (2012).
See, e.g., Hicks, supra note 24, at 633 (providing support for the argument that
"statutes of repose" are particularly beneficial to "specific groups of defendants").
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(a) (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(16) (2013); OR. REv.
STAT.§ 12.115 (2013).
See Scott A. DeVries, Note, Medical Malpractice Acts' Statutes of Limitation as They
Apply to Minors: Are They Proper?, 28 IND. L. REv. 413, 416--17 (1995) (discussing
the debate on the causes of the medical malpractice insurance crisis); Eiesland, supra
note 42, at 685-88 (1993) (discussing the validity and causes of the medical
malpractice insurance crisis).
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Considering "Statute of Repose" as a Term ofArt Rather Than a
Descriptive Phrase

Some court decisions reflect confusion that the term "statutes of
limitations" encompasses statutes of repose. 51 This likely arises from
the fact that definitions and descriptions of "statutes of limitations"
have often stated that "[s]tatutes of limitations are statutes of
repose .... "52 These definitions and descriptions, however, merely
state one of the functions of a statute of limitations, namely "repose,"
or "peace of mind" to a defendant after a set period of time; 53 they do
not mean that a "statute of repose,"-as a unique legal term of art in
common use over the last several decades-is a subspecies of statute
of limitations. 54
51.

52.

53.

54.

See, e.g., McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 781 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that as
of 1986, a number of cases confused the terms statute of limitations and statute of
repose "or used them interchangeably"); Nat' I Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. RBS Sec.,
Inc., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1240 (D. Kan. 2012) ("The terms 'statute of limitations'
and 'statute of repose' are often conflated.").
See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 835 (5th ed. 1979). An early treatise noted that
"[t]he statutes of limitation have been called by Lord Kenyon [Lord Chief Justice of
England, 1788-1802], statutes of repose; and have ever been described as a most
beneficial system of laws, and of the greatest importance to society; and very high
commendations have invariably been bestowed upon them by the Judges . . . . "
WILLIAM BLANSHARD, A TREATISE ON THE STATUTES OF LIMITATION 5-6 (London,
Joseph Butterworth and Son, 1826) (footnote omitted). Similarly, an early Supreme
Court case stated that statutes of limitations "are statutes of repose to quiet titles, to
suppress fraud, and to supply the deficiency of proofs arising from the ambiguity and
obscurity or antiquity of transactions." Hangar v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 532, 538 (1867).
Other early Supreme Court cases likewise stated that statutes of limitations were
"statutes of repose" in the descriptive sense rather than as a term of art with
independent legal significance. See, e.g., Traer v. Clews, 115 U.S. 528, 542 (1885);
Weber v. Bd. of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. 57, 70 (1873); United States v. Wiley, 78
U.S. 508,513 (1870).
Repose is just one of the functions of statutes of limitations; other functions of statutes
of limitations include encouraging the reasonably diligent presentation of claims and
promoting the just and efficient adjudication of claims. See Bain & Colella, supra
note 34, at 571-72. Statutes of limitation provide repose to a defendant by relieving a
defendant from having to defend stale claims where the quality of the evidence may
have deteriorated and by providing security and stability to a defendant to conduct its
affairs through a clearer understanding of its potential liabilities. Id. at 572. A
discovery rule of accrual gives greater weight to a plaintiffs knowledge of the claim
and less weight to the value of repose. See Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The
Puzzling Purposes of Statutes ofLimitations, 28 PAC. L.J. 453,458 (1997).
See Wenke v. Gehl Co., 682 N.W.2d 405, 423 (Wis. 2004). In discussing the
evolving meaning of the term statute of repose, the court stated that "[e]arly treatise
writers and judges considered time bars created by statutes of limitations, escheat and
adverse possession as periods of repose. As the courts began to modify statutory
limitations by applying the 'discovery rule,' legislatures responded by enacting
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In recent years, courts routinely recognize the separate natures and
functions of statutes of limitations and statutes of repose. For
example, in 1993 one court stated that a statute of limitations
"governs the time within which legal proceedings must be
commenced after the cause of action accrues," but a statute of repose
"is not related to the accrual of any cause of action. The injury need
not have occurred, much less have been discovered."55 Significantly,
courts have recognized that while statutes of limitations are
procedural, statutes of repose are substantive, creating a "substantive
right" to putative defendants '"to be free from liability after a
legislatively-determined period of time . . . based on considerations
of the economic best interests of the public as a whole. "'56
Accordingly, statutes of limitations and statutes of repose "apply in
ways that are independent of one another," and they "do not affect
each other directly, as they are triggered by entirely distinct events."57
The "defining characteristic of (a statute of repose] is that its time
period does not begin to run when the action accrues, but rather when
the relevant action occurs." 58
While having a separate function from a statute of limitations, a
statute of repose is sometimes included within the statutory provision
establishing the statute of limitations; in such provisions, the statute
of repose marks the outer temporal boundary of a defendant's
potential liability when there is a discovery rule of accrual for the
statute of limitations. North Carolina's general three year statute of

55.

56.

57.
58.

absolute statutes of repose." !d. (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Bradway v. Am. Nat'! Red Cross, 992 F.2d 298, 301 (11th Cir. 1993) (emphasis
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.
Co. v. Poole Chern. Co., 419 F.3d 355, 363 (5th Cir. 2005) (discussing the distinction
between a statute of limitations and a statute of repose); First United Methodist
Church of Hyattsville v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 865-66 (4th Cir. 1989)
(indicating that a statute of limitations is a procedural device and a statute of repose is
a substantive right).
Moore v. Liberty Nat'! Life Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 1209, 1218 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting
First United Methodist, 882 F.2d at 865-66); see also Rosenberg v. Town of N.
Bergen, 293 A.2d 662, 667 (N.J. 1972) ("The function of [a] statute [of repose] is thus
rather to define substantive rights than to alter or modify a remedy."); Cronin v.
Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tenn. 1995) ("[The] distinction has prompted courts to
hold that statutes of repose are substantive and extinguish both the right and the
remedy, while statutes of limitation are merely procedural, extinguishing only the
remedy.").
Moore, 267 F.3d at 1218.
!d.
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limitations for tort actions for personal injury or physical damage is
typical. The statute provides:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, for personal injury or
physical damage to claimant's property, the cause of action,
except in causes of actions referred to in G.S. 1-15(c)
[concerning professional malpractice actions], shall not
accrue until bodily harm to the claimant or physical damage
to his property becomes apparent or ought reasonably to
have become apparent to the claimant, whichever event first
occurs. Provided that no cause of action shall accrue more
than 10 years from the last act or omission of the defendant
giving rise to the cause of action. 59
The first sentence provides for a discovery rule of accrual for the
statute of limitations and the second sentence sets forth a statute of
repose. 60
The substantive nature of statutes of repose is legally significant.
Most states which have enacted statutes of repose recognize that they
create "substantive rights. "61 Thus, unlike procedural statutes of
limitations, substantive statutes of repose usually cannot be equitably
tolled. 62 The substantive nature of statutes of repose can also be
59.
60.

61.

62.

N.C. GEN. STAT.§ l-52(16) (2013).
This has been recognized by the North Carolina Supreme Court. See Wilson v.
McLeod Oil Co., 398 S.E.2d 586, 597 (N.C. 1990) (referencing "the statute of repose
found in l-52(16)" on numerous occasions).
See, e.g., Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P'ship, 254 P.3d 360, 366 (Ariz. 2011) (en
bane) ("[A] statute of repose defines a substantive right."); Harding v. K.C. Wall
Prods., Inc., 831 P.2d 958, 967 (Kan. 1992) (stating that a statute of repose "is
substantive"); Dawson v. N.C. Dep't ofEnv't & Nat. Res., 694 S.E.2d 427,430 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2010) ("A statute of repose is a substantive limitation, and is a condition
precedent to a party's right to maintain a lawsuit." (internal quotation marks
omitted)); FDIC v. Lenk, 361 S.W.3d 602, 609 (Tex. 2012) (stating that the statute of
repose was a "substantive definition of rights" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
See, e.g., Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030, 1048 (9th Cir. 2013) (en bane) (stating that
a statute of repose "is not subject to equitable tolling"); Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of
Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2013) (stating that statutes of
repose create substantive rights and are only subject to legislatively-created
exceptions, not equitable tolling); First United Methodist Church of Hyattsville v.
U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 866 (4th Cir. 1989) ("A statute of repose is typically
an absolute time limit beyond which liability no longer exists and is not tolled for any
reason because to do so would upset the economic balance struck by the legislative
body."); Capco of Summerville, Inc. v. J.H. Gayle Constr. Co., 628 S.E.2d 38, 41
(S.C. 2006) ("A statute of repose is typically an absolute time limit beyond which
liability no longer exists and is not tolled for any reason because to do so would upset
the economic balance struck by the legislative body.").
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significant with respect to preemption. The creation of a substantive
right under state tort law falls within a traditional area of state legal
authority so that there is a strong presumption that Congress did not
intend to preempt state law. 63
III. APPLICATION OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION TO STATE
STATUTES OF REPOSE
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
"the Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the
land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding. " 64 Courts often must determine whether a
particular federal statute preempts state law. The Supreme Court has
recognized three types of preemption: express preemption, field
preemption, and conflict preemption. 65
Courts apply the doctrine of express preemption when Congress
has explicitly stated that it is preempting state law. 66 As applied to
state statutes of repose, Congress could specifically provide that state
statutes of repose are preempted for particular actions. In the
simplest case, Congress could use the term "statute of repose" in the
preemption provision and particularly specify how and when the
statute is preempted. But Congress could also expressly preempt
state statutes of repose without using the phrase; for example,
Congress could preempt "any statutory time period provided by state
law that would foreclose the action." As we will see, the analysis of
whether CERCLA preempts state statutes of repose involves

63.

64.
65.
66.

See, e.g., In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 725 F.3d 65,
96 (2d Cir. 2013) ("[Since the] imposing [of] state tort law liability falls well within
the state's historic powers to protect the health, safety, and property rights of its
citizens ... The presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt state law tort
verdicts is particularly strong."); Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 94
(2d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he [state] legislature's desire to rein in state-based tort liability
falls squarely within its prerogative to 'regulat[e] matters of health and safety,' which
is a sphere in which the presumption against preemption applies, indeed, stands at its
strongest.") (quoting Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348
(2001)); Coyne & Delany Co. v. Selman, 98 F.3d 1457, 1467 (4th Cir. 1996) (The
starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law is especially
true in cases involving fields of traditional state regulation, including common law
tort liability.") (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500-01 (2012); Wis. Pub. Intervenor
v. Mortimer, 501 U.S. 597,604-05 (1991).
See Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1974-75
(2011).
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application of express preemption to determine whether the language
of 42 U.S.C. Section 9658 67-which uses the terms "statutes of
limitations" and "limitations period," but not "statutes of repose"-68
preempts state statutes of repose.
Under the doctrine of field preemption, circumstances give rise to
the inference that "Congress intends federal law to 'occupy the
field,"' 69 leaving no room for a state law claim. 70 This can occur
when Congress enacts a "framework of regulation 'so pervasive ...
that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,"' or
"where there is a 'federal interest ... so dominant that the federal
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the
same subject. "' 71 With respect to state statutes of repose, Congress
may have decided to occupy an entire field of state substantive law,
which would include any state statute of repose for causes of action
in that field.
Finally, under the doctrine of conflict preemption, Congress
preempts state laws that conflict with federal law. 72 This includes
circumstances in which compliance with both state and federal law is
a physical impossibility and occasions when state law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's objectives as expressed
in federal law. 73 Thus, if it would be impossible to enforce both a
federal law and a state statute of repose, then federal law preempts
the statute. Alternatively, federal law may preempt a statute of
repose, if application of the statute of repose would defeat an
expressed congressional objective. That a statute contains an express
preemption provision or a savings clause does not foreclose
application of conflict preemption. 74
Whether the FTCA preempts state statutes of repose can involve
both field and conflict preemption. There is no express preemption
provision in the FTCA, but one court, applying the doctrine of field
67.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

For ease of reference, this article refers to sections ofCERCLA by section designation
within the United States Code, rather than by section designation in CERCLA. Courts
sometimes refer to provisions of CERCLA by the CERCLA section number;
consequently, this section is sometimes referenced as Section 309.
42 u.s.c. § 9658 (2006).
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (quoting California
v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989)).
See, e.g., Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. I, II (2003).
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
Id.
Id.; FreightlinerCorp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280,287 (1995).
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352 (2001); Geier v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 870-71 (2000).
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preemption has considered whether Congress intended to leave any
room for state statutes ofrepose, 75 and several courts have considered
whether state statutes of repose conflict with limitations provisions in
the FTCA. 76
Whichever mode of preemption analysis applies, congressional
intent is the "ultimate touchstone" in determining whether a federal
statute preempts state law. 77 This raises the question of how best to
determine congressional intent to preempt state statutes of repose.
IV. AN INTERPRETIVE APPROACH FOR DETERMINING
WHETHER FEDERAL LAW PREEMPTS STATE STATUTES
OF REPOSE
Because the question of federal preemption turns on whether
Congress intended to preempt state law, answering the question is an
exercise of statutory interpretation. A court must determine whether
a particular provision in a federal statute expressly preempts a state
statute of repose or whether there are other reliable bases to fmd
congressional intent to preempt. In addition to the plain meaning of
the text, courts consider applicable canons of construction, statutory
context, legislative history, and statutory purposes to determine
congressional intent. 78 Some indicia of intent may be direct, but
others may be indirect. For example, the language of a statute or its
legislative history may directly show that Congress intended to
preempt state statutes of repose. On the other hand, Congress may
indirectly show intent to preempt statutes of repose through a
comprehensive legislative framework that necessarily precludes
operation of these statutes or through a particular provision which
cannot be implemented while enforcing a state statute ofrepose. 79
Courts are to interpret fairly federal statutes to effectuate
congressional intent. 80 Principles of statutory construction offer
guidelines to the appropriate outer bounds of statutory interpretation.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

80.

Mamea v. United States, Civil No. 08-00563 LEK-RLP, 2011 WL 4371712, at *9-11
(D. Haw. Sept. 16, 2011).
See infra notes 359-{;7 and accompanying text.
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,485 (1996).
City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1876 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Bank of Am. v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 558 (9th Cir.
2002) (stating that under the doctrines of field preemption and conflict preemption,
one can fmd an implicit congressional intent to preempt).
See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) ("The ultimate
question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it can
improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law.").
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The starting point must always be the plain meaning of the text of the
statute. 81 When the text of the statute is clear, the inquiry is
complete. 82 But, when the text of the statute is ambiguous, courts
should consider established canons of statutory construction,
considering first "text-based" canons and then, if necessary,
"substantive" canons. 83
Fair statutory construction involves
evaluating all potentially applicable and valid canons of construction,
not just those that favor a particular outcome. 84 Courts may also
consider the context of the statute, its legislative history and its
purposes to determine congressional intent regarding preemption. 85
Statutory context, history and purposes may be particularly important
in determining whether Congress has completely occupied a field or
enacted a provision that conflicts with state law. As with the canons
of construction, a key to fair interpretation is an even-handed
assessment of these signposts of congressional intent, including an
appreciation that enacted legislation is usually the result of a process
of legislative compromises. When a court cherry-picks certain
indications of congressional intent to support an outcome, without
giving due consideration of those that support an opposite conclusion,
81.
82.
83.

84.
85.

Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1893 (2013).
Conn. Nat'! Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992).
See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 325 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) ("Canons
of [construction] are quite often useful in close cases, or when statutory language is
ambiguous. But ... [they] are not a license for the judiciary to rewrite language
enacted by the legislature.") (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
With respect to canons for statutory interpretation, this article relies primarily on the
leading treatise on statutory interpretation, NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBlE
SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION {7th ed. 2007), particularly
Chapters 47, 58, 60, and 62, and on ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012), which is self-described as "the
first modem attempt, certainly in a century, to collect and arrange only the valid
canons (perhaps a third of the possible candidates) and to show how and why they
apply to proper legal interpretation." !d. at 9 (footnote omitted). The distinction
between "text-based canons" and "substantive canons," is from Blake A. Watson,
Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose Canon: Have the
Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 199, 222-28
(1996). Professor Watson draws this distinction based upon the functions of canons
from several sources, including Denise W. DeFranco, Chevron and Canons of
Statutory Construction, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 829, 839 (1990); Daniel B.
Rodriguez, The Presumption ofReviewability: A Study in Canonical Construction and
its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REv. 743,743-44 (1992); and Stephen F. Ross, Where
Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45
VAND. L. REv. 561, 563 ( 1992). This distinction is discussed in more detail in the text
accompanying notes 106-60 infra.
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 83, at 59.
E.g., City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1876 (2013).
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the court risks engaging in judicial law-making. 86 Application of a
rational interpretive approach can show whether a court is performing
a legitimate judicial function in deciding what Congress must have
intended in a statute or is instead deciding what Congress should
have provided in the statute, which is a matter of policy for the
legislature.
A.

Using Evidence-Based Methods to Determine Federal
Preemption

For years, commentators and judges have argued about the
appropriate approach to statutory interpretation. Some have argued
for a textualist approach, which draws meaning from the text of the
statute and nothing else; others have advocated an intentionalist
approach, which goes beyond the text of the statute where necessary
to draw meaning from the intent of the legislature, as inferred from
the statute's text, legislative history and purposes. 87
Few disputes reach courts where the text of the statute clearly
determines the outcome. Courts must decide cases when the meaning
of the statute is not clear from the text. In many such circumstances,
courts can rationally infer congressional intent considering canons of
construction and extra-textual resources. 88 For example, the doctrines
of field preemption and conflict preemption apply when there is no
applicable express preemption provision. The analysis requires

86.

87.

88.

For example, in reviewing legislative history, which is often extensive, one can rely
only on the evidence that supports a preferred conclusion. Justice Scalia has
dismissed use of legislative history as providing "something for everyone;" stating
that it can "be either relied upon or dismissed with equal plausibility," he argues that it
has facilitated decisions "based upon the courts' policy preferences." ANTONIN
SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 35-36 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
Justice Scalia has noted that Judge Harold Leventhal "describe[d] the use of
legislative history as the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking
over the heads of the guests for one's friends." Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511,
519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on
the Use ofLegislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195,
214 (1983) (quoting Judge Harold Leventhal).
SINGER & SINGER, supra note 83, § 45:8, at 47-49. For a consideration of various
textual and extra-textual views of statutory interpretation, see SCALIA & GARNER,
supra note 83, at 15-28; William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative
Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REv. 531, 532-40 (2013) (reviewing SCALIA & GARNER,
supra note 83).
See SCALIA, supra note 86, at 16-19, 36.
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determining congressional intent that is not clear from text but must
be determined by statutory context, legislative history, and purpose. 89
Evaluating competing theories of statutory interpretation is beyond
the scope of this article. As a practical matter, most federal judges,
particularly those in the district courts and circuit courts of appeal,
follow what may best be termed an "evidence-based" approach to
statutory interpretation. 90 Invariably, judges will begin by looking at
the text of the statute. But when the text is ambiguous, judges use
evidence-based paradigms to resolve the ambiguities.91 Initially, textbased canons of construction allow the courts to draw logical
conclusions from the text. Based on principles of semantics, syntax,
and context, these canons are comparable to logical conclusions
regarding reliability, and therefore admissibility, that evidentiary
rules supply for certain types of evidence. Considering the text,
along with the text-based canons of construction may be sufficient to
decide the interpretive question. If not, the court may then consider
substantive canons of construction which supply presumptions of
interpretation that are comparable to evidentiary presumptions.
In light of any presumption regarding interpretation of the statute,
the court can weigh various forms of "evidence" of congressional
intent to resolve the ambiguity. 92 This evidence can include
legislative context, history and purpose. 93 Some forms of evidence
may be more probative than others; for example, there may be good
reasons to discount certain types of evidence, such as the remark of a
lone legislator in the Congressional Record regarding the purpose of
a particular provision. But, the fact that legislative history may
include this type of evidence is not good reason to discount all
legislative history. Judges are experienced in weighing evidence and
giving it the probative value it deserves in light of evidentiary
presumptions. The evaluation of all potentially relevant valid canons
of statutory construction along with the careful consideration of any
potentially probative evidence of congressional intent can lead to an
objective determination of whether Congress intended to preempt
statutes of repose. The interpretive approach outlined here provides a
framework for reaching objective conclusions on this issue as well as
evaluating judicial decision-making.
89.

SCALIA & GARNER,

supra note 83, at 18-20; SINGER & SINGER, supra note 83, § 45:5,

at 35-36.
supra note 83, § 45:13, at 129.

90.

SINGER& SINGER,

91.

/d.

92.

See id. § 45:5, at 35-40 (explaining examples of forms of evidence that courts may
consider in resolving ambiguities).
/d.§ 45:5, at 35-36; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 83, at 18-20.

93.
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Considering the Plain Meaning of the Text of the Statute

In interpreting a statute, a court must start with the statutory text. 94
The Supreme Court explained in 1917:
[i]t is elementary that the meaning of a statute, must, in the
first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is
framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the
constitutional authority of the lawmaking body which
passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms. 95
The Court stressed, "[ w]here the language is plain and admits of no
more than one meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise, and
the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion."96
As a corollary, the terms in a statute are interpreted in accordance
with their ordinary meaning, unless otherwise defined in the statute,97
and courts should assume that the ordinary meaning of the language
in a statute accurately reflects legislative purpose. 98 Unless the plain
and ordinary meaning of the text leads to an absurd result, the "sole
function of the courts ... is to enforce it according to its terms." 99
And, to "justify a departure from the letter of the law upon [the
ground of absurdity], the absurdity must be so gross as to shock the
general moral or common sense." 100
Beyond the "absurdity exception," the Supreme Court for many
years also endorsed a departure from the plain meaning of text in
"rare and exceptional circumstances" when the plain meaning was
contrary to the congressional intent. 101 But, that is no longer the case.

94.
95.
96.
97.

Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. I886, I893 (2013).
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,485 (1917) (citations omitted).
/d.
Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at I893 (quoting BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 9I
(2006)); see Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982).
98.
Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. II66, II72 (20I3) (quoting Hardt v. Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 25I (20IO)).
99.
Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. I, 6
(2000)) ..
100. Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note
83, at 234 (describing absurdity doctrine as allowing a provision to be "disregarded or
judicially corrected as an error (when the correction is textually simple) if failing to do
so would result in a disposition that no reasonable person could approve").
101. See Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. I29, 135-36 (199I); Train v. Colo. Pub. Interest
Research Grp., Inc., 426 U.S. I, 9-10 (I976); United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns,
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Over the last several decades, the Court has stressed that the plain
meaning rule is the "cardinal" canon of statutory construction so that
"courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means
and means in a statute what it says there." 102 "When the words of a
statute are unambiguous ... this first canon is also the last: 'judicial
inquiry is complete. "' 103 Thus, the Court has found that unambiguous
statutory text must be applied according to its plain meaning without
review of legislative history regarding congressional intent. 104
Courts have held that the plain meaning rule applies to interpreting
the scope of an express preemption provision. So, when federal law
contains an express preemption clause, the court must "focus on the
plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best
evidence of Congress'[s] preemptive intent." 105
C.

Employing Recognized Canons of Statutory Construction

Canons of interpretation reflect "centuries-old wisdom" that they
are "helpful, neutral guides" to interpretation. 106 As part of an
"interpretive regime," they provide "some degree of insulation
against judicial arbitrariness . . . [and render] statutory interpretation
more predictable, regular, and coherent .... " 107
Canons of
construction that might be relevant to determination of whether
federal law preempts state statutes of repose can be categorized as

102.

103.
104.

105.

106.
107.

Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940); see also MORI Assocs. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl.
503, 537-39 (2011) (discussing the history of the exception).
Conn. Nat') Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (citations omitted); see
also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003) ("Our precedents make clear
that the starting point for our analysis is the statutory text."); Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) ("As in any case of statutory construction, our
analysis beings with 'the language of the statute."').
Conn. Nat'/ Bank, 503 U.S. at 254 (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430
(1981 )).
See, e.g., Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 380, 387, 391-93 (2009); Jimenez v.
Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009); Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith
Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 254 (2000).
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) (quoted in Chamber of
Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1977 (2011 )); see also Sprietsma
v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-63 (2002) (quoting CSX Transp., Inc., 507 U.S.
at 664).
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 83, at 60--61.
William N. Eskridge & PhillipP. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARv.
L. REv. 26, 66 (1994); see also David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory
Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 921,925 (1992) (noting that canons are "important
and valuable" in resolving questions of construction).
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text-based canons or substantive canons. 108 Text-based canons are not
policy-based; they use linguistic principles of semantics, syntax and
context to determine what a legislature meant by using particular
statutory language. 109 By contrast, substantive canons direct courts to
resolve ambiguities in certain ways to further a pre-determined policy
objective. 110 Substantive canons do not purport to determine
legislative intent based upon inferences from statutory language; but,
to the extent they reflect the common law background against which
legislation is enacted, they reflect a reasonable inference of
legislative intent. 111
1. Using Text-Based Canons to Derive Meaning from the Text
Text-based canons of construction can help determine whether
federal provisions preempt state statutes of repose. First, under the
"fixed-meaning" canon words in statutes must take the same meaning

See Watson, supra note 83, at 222-28. Justice Scalia and Bryan Gamer have further
categorized the "text-based canons" as semantic canons, syntactic canons, and
contextual canons and the "substantive canons" as expected-meaning canons,
government-structuring canons, private-right canons, and stabilizing canons. See
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 83, passim.
I 09. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive
Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REv. I, 12 (2005) ("Language canons ...
are predictive guidelines as to what the legislature likely meant based on its choice of
certain words rather than others, or its grammatical configuration of those words in a
given sentence, or the relationship between those words and text found in other parts
of the same statute or in similar statutes."); Ross, supra note 83, at 563 (noting that
"descriptive canons . . . involve predictions as to what the legislature must have
meant" by incorporating "[r]ules of syntax or grammar" and other principles such as
avoiding "internal inconsistency or conflict with other enactments"); Shapiro, supra
note 107, at 927 (noting that certain canons are "linguistic," do not "express any
policy preference" but rather "simply purport to be helpful ways of divining the nature
and limits of what the drafters of the legislation were trying to achieve").
110. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 109, at 13 (stating that "substantive canons" are
"grounded in the courts' understanding of how to treat statutory text with reference to
judicially perceived constitutional priorities, pre-enactment common law practices, or
specific statutorily based policies"); Ross, supra note 83, at 563 (referring to
substantive canons as "normative canons"); Phillip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and
Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law,
107 HARV. L. REv. 381, 407, 414 (1993) (describing substantive canons as "policybased" canons).
Ill. See SCALIA & GARNER supra note 83, at 61 (stating that "canons influence not just
how courts approach texts but also the techniques that legal drafters follow in
preparing those texts").

108.
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they had at the time a text was adopted. II 2 Because the common
understanding of the phrases "statutes of limitations" and "statutes of
repose" can change over time, it is important for courts to consider
the commonly understood meaning of those phrases at the time the
legislation was enacted in deciding whether federal law preempts the
state statute.
The "whole text" canon requires courts to consider the entirety of
the text, including its "structure" and the "physical and logical
relation of its many parts" in interpretation.IIJ In applying this canon,
the court should consider "how much of a statutory context of the
particular word or passage is relevant and probative for its
construction."II 4 This canon and its "sub-canons," such as the
"associated words" canoniis and the "surplusage" canonii 6 can assist
courts in considering "statutory context" to determine whether federal
law preempts state statutes of repose.
The "title and heading" canon allows courts, in certain
circumstances, to use titles or headings as interpretive aids. 117 In
1947, the Supreme Court stated: "For interpretative purposes, they
112. Id. at 78 (stating that the fixed-meaning canon means "[w]ords must be given the
meaning they had when the text was adopted"); see also Reinke v. N. Pac. Ry. Co.,
145 F. 988, 990 (C.C.D. Mont. 1906) ("[I]t is laid down as an elementary principle in
the construction of statutes that the common usage of words at the time of enactment
is a true criterion by which to determine their meaning.") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
113. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 83, at 167; see also SINGER & SINGER, supra note 83, §
46:5, at 189-90 ("[E]ach part or section [of a statute] should be construed in
connection with every other part or section to produce a harmonious whole.").
114. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 83, § 47:2, at 278; see also id. § 47:2, at 279-80
(providing guidelines "for determining how much and what kinds of context are
relevant and probative for statutory construction").
115. The associated words canon colloquially holds that "a word is known by the company
it keeps," and stands for the proposition that associated words bear on each other's
meaning. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,575 (1995); see also SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 83, at 195 ("[W]ords are given meaning by their context.");
SINGER & SINGER, supra note 83, § 47:16, at 347-57 ("[T]he meaning of doubtful
words may be determined by reference to their relationship with other associated
words and phrases.").
116. The surplusage canon holds that every word and phrase should be given effect, if
possible because an interpretation that ignores or fails to account for words or phrases
is improbable. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 83, at 174; SINGER & SINGER, supra
note 83, § 46:6, at 230-47; id. § 46:7, at 265.
117. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 83, at 221-22; see also SINGER & SINGER, supra
note 83, § 47:14, at 339-40 (''[W]here headings are enacted as part of an act, or as
part of a code, or where the meaning of the act is ambiguous, or where there has been
a revision, the headings may serve as an aid to the legislative intent.") (footnotes
omitted).
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are of use only when they shed light on some ambiguous word or
phrase. They are but tools available for the resolution of a doubt.
But they cannot undo or limit that which the text makes plain." 118
Thus, if there is ambiguity regarding whether a provision preempts
statutes of repose, a court may consider the heading of the provision.
A heading that stated "Preemption of State Time Limitations," could
provide a basis for concluding that the section applied to both statutes
of limitations and statutes of repose. On the other hand, a heading
that stated "Accrual of State Procedural Periods," would provide
evidence that the preemptive reach of the section was limited to
procedural statutes of limitations which are triggered by the accrual
of a cause of action.
A final example of a common text-based canon of construction that
may be relevant to the preemption analysis is the "negative
implication" canon reflected in the Latin phrase expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, which means the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another. 119 In Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 120 the
Court, applying the canon to an express preemption provision
regarding "advertising or promotion" of cigarettes, held that the
amended Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempted
failure to warn claims, but did not preempt other state law claims,
such as those based on express warranty, intentional fraud and
misrepresentation, or conspiracy. 121 A few years later, in Freightliner
Corp. v. Myrick, 122 the Court explained that its application of the
canon in Cippollone did not mean that Congress's inclusion of an
express preemption provision necessarily precluded preemption of
other matters under the field preemption or conflict preemption
doctrines. 123 The Court stated "[t]he fact that an express definition of
the pre-emptive reach of a statute 'implies'-i.e., supports a
reasonable inference-that Congress did not intend to preempt other
118. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947)
(quoted in SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 83, at 221).
119. See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (applying the canon in
the preemption context); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 83, at 107-11
(discussing the appropriate uses of the canon); SINGER & SINGER, supra note 83, §§
47:23, 47:24, 47:25, at 398-438 (explaining the rule, its relevance, and limitations);
id. § 47:24 at 421-22 (describing the maxim and noting that it is "a product of 'logic
and common sense' ... [that] acts merely as an aid to determine legislative intent and
does not constitute a rule oflaw") (footnotes omitted).
120. Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504.
121. /d. at 517-32.
122. 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
123. /d. at 287-88.
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matters does not mean that the express clause entirely forecloses any
possibility of implied pre-emption." 124
Courts should consider whether these or other text-based canons of
construction provide logical inferences of meaning from the language
of the statute. A court may be able to resolve any initial ambiguity in
interpretation by fair application of the text-based canons. This may
not resolve the ambiguity entirely; it may make the text more or less
ambiguous. But ambiguity sufficient to resort to other indicators of
meaning only exists when one can advance plausible alternative
interpretations of statutory text. 125 Therefore, a court should not
strain to find ambiguity in a statute by positing implausible
interpretations. 126 Nevertheless, some interpretations may be more
plausible than others, and a court should take into account the relative
plausibility of an interpretation in resolving an ambiguity. 127 If
ambiguity in interpretation remains after application of relevant textbased canons, a court should consider the substantive canons of
construction and other evidence of congressional intent. 128
2.Using Substantive Canons to Determine Whether There Should
Be a Presumption Regarding Meaning
Because the central question in the interpretive approach is whether
federal law preempts state statutes of repose, the analysis of
substantive canons of construction begins with the "presumption
against preemption" canon. This canon is founded on "the basic
assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law," 129
because the "exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be

124. /d. at 288.
125. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 566--67 (2005)
(finding that a proposed interpretation did not create ambiguity because it was not
plausible).
126. See, e.g., Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320,331 (1997) (stating that it would be a strain
to find ambiguity in a proposed interpretation).
127. See Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 41 (2008)
(evaluating plausible textual meanings of a statutory provision by considering which
meaning is "more natural" before considering other contextual and substantive aides
to meaning).
128. See United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 274, 294-95 (3rd
Cir. 2013) (stating that in an interpretive analysis of statutory language, the court
considers text-based, or "descriptive" canons first, and if application of such canons
"settle the meaning," the court's task is complete, but, if they do not, the court
considers substantive or "normative" canons).
129. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725,746 (1981).
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presumed." 130 "This assumption provides assurance that 'the federalstate balance' ... will not be disturbed unintentionally by Congress
or unnecessarily by the courts." 131 Professor Norman J. Singer, an
author of the leading treatise on statutory interpretation, has
characterized the presumption against preemption as a "strong" one
so that "preemption can only be found if the federal law evinces a
legislative intent to preempt the state law, or there is such direct and
positive conflict that the two acts cannot be reconciled or consistently
stand together." 132 Indeed, the Supreme Court has characterized the
presumption as a "cornerstone" of its preemption jurisprudence. 133
While some commentators have questioned the vitality of the
presumption, 134 it continues to be cited, and relied upon, in Supreme
Court decisions. 135

130. N.Y. State Dep't. of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (quoting
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 203 (1952)).
131. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (quoting United States v. Bass,
404 u.s. 336, 349 (1971)).
132. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 83, § 36:9, at 93; see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note
83, at 290 ("It is a reliable canon of interpretation- though sometimes dishonored in
the breach-to presume that a federal statute does not preempt state law.").
133. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
u.s. 470,485 (1996)).
134. See, e.g., Mary J. Davis, The "New" Presumption Against Preemption, 61 HASTINGS
L.J. 1217, 1247, 1251 (2010) (arguing that the presumption continues to be part of
Supreme Court jurisprudence and is strongest in express preemption cases, where it is
a "meaningful default rule" in the absence of a clear and manifest intent of Congress,
but is less rigid and more forgiving in implied preemption cases); S. Candace Hoke,
Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REv. 685, 733
(1991) (stating that the Supreme Court's devotion to the presumption "can only be
described as fickle"); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, I 02
Nw. U. L. REv. 727, 741 (2008) ("[T]he presumption against preemption is honored as
much in the breach as in observance . . . [and is] at the very least overbroad, as the
Court seems to have recognized in recent decisions."); Ernest A. Young, "The
Ordinary Diet of the Law": The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts
Court, 2011 SuP. CT. REv. 253, 308-09 (2011) (noting that the presumption against
preemption canon seems be referenced only in "close" cases as a "tiebreaker rule" and
thus the failure to mention the presumption does not necessarily signify that it is not
good law).
135. See, e.g., Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1950 (2013) (regarding state laws
governing domestic relations, there is a '"presumption against preemption"'); Arizona
v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (stating that courts should not assume
that historic state police powers are preempted unless that was the clear and manifest
intent of Congress); Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565 (stating that courts should not assume that
historic state police powers are preempted unless that was the clear and manifest
intent of Congress); Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008) (stating that
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As referenced earlier, the presumption against preemption is
particularly applicable to areas of traditional state legal authority .136
The Supreme Court has specifically stated that such areas of
traditional authority include the "historic police powers of the
States," 137 "state regulation of matters of health and safety," 138 and
"family law." 139 State tort law falls within "state regulation of health
and safety" as an area of traditional state authority to which courts
apply the presumption against preemption. 140 The presence of federal
regulation in an area will not foreclose application of the presumption
against preemption. 141 But, the presumption will not apply to a
preemption analysis concerning a traditional area of state authority
when Congress is acting under a specific constitutional provlSlon,
such as regulation of election law under the Elections Clause of
Article I. 142
With respect to express preemption in particular, the presumption
against preemption resolves any ambiguities in the language of the
express preemption provision. Consequently, "when the text of a

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

141.

142.

courts should not assume that historic state police powers are preempted unless that
was the clear and manifest intent of Congress).
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991); see also circuit court cases cited at
supra note 63.
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947)).
Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485.
Egelhoffv. Egelhoff ex ref. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001).
See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565 & n.3 (finding that presumption applied and federal
legislation did not preempt state tort law claim); Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 (applying
presumption in finding that state tort law claims were not preempted); Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251-53 (1984) (stating Congress enacted
legislation under the assumption that state tort law would apply); see also circuit court
cases cited supra note 63 (stating that the presumption applies when displacing state
tort law is at issue). But see Mut. Pharrn. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2483 n.1
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion failed "to adhere to the
presumption against pre-emption" in finding federal law preempted a state tort law
claim).
See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565 n.3 (rejecting the argument that the presumption against
preemption does not apply because the federal government has regulated in an area,
stating "[t]he presumption ... accounts for the historic presence of state law but does
not rely on the absence of federal regulation"). But see United States v. South
Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 529 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating that the presumption against
preemption did not apply because the state law impacts immigration, an area
traditionally regulated by the federal government).
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2256-57 (2013).
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pre-emption clause is susceptible of more than one plausible reading,
courts ordinarily 'accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption."' 143
Another potentially applicable substantive canon of construction is
the "remedial purpose" canon under which remedial statutes are
construed broadly or liberally to effectuate their remedial purposes. 144
Professor Singer notes that this canon is "firmly established" and
expressions of the canon "appear over and over in judicial
opinions." 145 But, some courts disfavor this canon because of its
unconstrained elasticity. 146 Justice Scalia, one of the most vocal
critics of this canon refers to it as a "dice loading rule" as opposed to
a "no-thumb-on-the scales" canon of interpretation. 147 He has
written:
[The presumption] is so wonderfully indeterminate, as to
both when it applies and what it achieves, that it can be
used, or not used, or half-used, almost ad libitum, depending
mostly upon whether its use, or nonuse, or half-use, will
assist in reaching the result the court wishes to achieve. 148

143. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008) (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences
LLC, 544 U.S. 431,449 (2005)).
144. See, e.g., Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 268 (1977) ("[Remedial
legislation] must be liberally construed in conformance with its purpose . . . . ")
(quoting Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333 (1953)); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65
(1968) ("[R]emedial statutes should be liberally construed."); R&W Technical Servs.
Ltd. v. CFTC, 205 F.3d 165, 173 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Remedial statutes are to be
construed liberally.").
145. 3 SINGER & SINGER, supra note 83, § 60:1, at 250-52 (7th ed. 2008).
146. See, e.g., United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 274, 293 (3rd
Cir. 2013) ("[W]e doubt that such a broad interpretive rule can be justified on its own
terms."); E. Bay Mun. Uti!. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 142 F.3d 479,484 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (citations omitted) (noting the court has expressed doubt about the canon
that "remedial statutes are to be construed liberally" since "virtually any statute is
remedial in some respect"); Ober United Travel Agency, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor,
135 F.3d 822, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that any statute might be thought of as
remedial, and stating that "[w]e suspect that the phrase typically has been used to give
judicial approval to a particular set of policy viewpoints").
147. See SCALIA, supra note 86, at 27-29.
148. See Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 581, 586 (1990). See generally id. at 581-86 (discussing the problems
with the presumption that "remedial statutes are to be liberally construed"). Justice
Scalia states "[o]f what value, one might reasonably ask, is a rule that is both of
indeterminate coverage (since no one knows what a 'remedial statute' is) and of
indeterminate effect (since no one knows how liberal is a liberal construction)." !d. at
586. See also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 83, at 364 (stating that the "oft-repeated
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Problems with the canon include "determining what constitutes a
remedial statute" and "identifying what a 'liberal construction"'
should be. 149 Nevertheless, this canon is part of the background of
the law, and as long as there are some limits on its use, it may be a
useful aid in resolving textual ambiguities to determine congressional
intent. Professor Blake A. Watson, who studied application of the
remedial purpose canon to CERCLA, identified limits that courts
have recognized for the appropriate use of the canon. 150 According to
Professor Watson, courts have circumscribed the use of the remedial
purpose canon in four situations:
( 1) when it is "plain" (from the text or otherwise) that
Congress did not desire an expansive reading of the
remedial statute; (2) when a liberal construction would
either upset a legislatively crafted compromise or conflict
with other statutory goals; (3) when reliance on the canon
clashes with other extrastatutory, meta-principles, or
interpretive rules; and (4) when an expansive interpretation
might actually hinder-rather than serve-the remedial
objectives of the statute in question. 151
Additionally, a court should not justify a broad interpretation of a
provision of a statute when such an interpretation is not directly
related to the remedial purposes of the legislation. Because the canon
is most often stated in terms of giving a statute a broad or liberal
construction to "effectuate its remedial purposes," 152 there should be a
close relationship between that interpretation and the remedial
purposes of the statute. 153
In the context of preemption of state statutes of repose, if the
statute is remedial, and preemption of the state statute of repose is
directly related to the remedial purpose of the statute, then
application of this canon to favor preemption may be appropriate
providing there are no countervailing considerations such as those
identified by Professor Watson.

and age-old formulation . . . needlessly invites judicial lawmaking") (footnote
omitted).
149. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 83, at 364-65.
150. Watson, supra note 83, at 243.
151. /d.
152. See, e.g., SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002).
153. See, e.g., Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 449 U.S. 268, 281-82
(1980) (rejecting a broad interpretation because the sole purpose of the statute was not
to provide a complete remedy for industrial injuries).
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A fmal substantive canon that may be relevant to the determination
of whether a federal provision preempts state law is the "presumption
against waivers of sovereign immunity" canon which holds that
waivers of sovereign immunity must be "'unequivocally expressed'
in statutory text." 154 The Supreme Court has stated that "a waiver of
the Government's sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in
terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign." 155 As with the other
substantive canons, this canon is only helpful in resolving textual
ambiguities; it does not apply when the words of the statute are
plain. 156 Thus, if the scope of Congress's waiver is not "clearly
discemable from the statutory text in light of traditional interpretive
tools," the court should "take the interpretation most favorable to the
Govemment." 157 The canon is strongest when it is consistent with
other canons of construction. 158 As discussed below for the FTCA,
federal preemption of substantive state tort law may impact one of
the conditions of the government's waiver of sovereign immunity in
the Act; therefore, a court should consider the potential application of
this canon in any preemption analysis involving the FTCA.
The substantive canons of construction may point in different
directions with respect to whether federal law preempts state statutes
of repose. For example, the presumption against preemption canon
may favor a narrow interpretation of the preemptive scope of federal
law while the remedial purpose canon would recommend a broad
construction. Courts should not disregard substantive canons of
construction whenever potentially applicable canons provide
conflicting indications of meaning. 159 Instead, courts should carefully
154. FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (2012); see also United States v. Bormes, 133
S. Ct. 12, 16-17, (2012).
155. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (citing United States v. Williams, 514 U.S.
527,531 (1995)); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310,318 (1986); Lehman v.
Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 161 (1981).
156. Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1895-96 (2013); Conn. Nat'! Bank v. Germain,
503 u.s. 249, 253-54 (1992).
157. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1448.
158. See Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571, 589 (2008) (citing cases in
which the canon was cited with other tools of construction).
159. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 83, at 59--61. Responding to Professor Karl
Llewellyn's criticism of the use of substantive canons given that "there are two
opposing canons on almost every point," the authors state that canons are "helpful,
neutral guides" that can offer competing inferences to be considered and that the "skill
of sound construction lies in assessing the clarity and weight of each clue and
deciding where the balance lies." /d. (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the
Theory ofAppellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395,401 (1950)).
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evaluate which canon is most applicable to the interpretive question
and provide sound reasons for favoring one substantive canon of
interpretation over another. 160 When a court relies on one substantive
canon of construction, while ignoring other arguably applicable
canons, there is a risk that the court is following a "results-oriented"
approach rather than objectively interpreting the statue. A fair
evaluation of the substantive canons will include consideration of the
limitations of each canon as discussed above. Once the court has
weighed all potentially relevant substantive canons of construction, it
can determine whether a presumption for or against preemption of
state statutes of repose is appropriate.
D.

Considering Whether Statutory Context, Legislative History, or
Purposes of the Statute Rebut Any Presumption Regarding
Meaning

Any presumption regarding preemption of state statutes of repose
can be rebutted if there is sufficient evidence of congressional intent
that runs contrary to the presumption. 161 The Supreme Court has
often employed presumptions in its statutory analyses, and through
analyzing evidence of congressional intent, the Court has
demonstrated the strength of the evidence of congressional intent
necessary to overcome a presumption. 162 Individual judges may
weigh various types of evidence differently depending on judicial
outlook, but the categories of evidence generally considered include
statutory context, legislative history, and statutory purposes.
The text of a statute, even if it does not expressly preempt state
statutes of repose, may provide evidence to overcome a presumption
against preemption through the doctrines of field preemption or
conflict preemption. Statutory context, as reflected in particular
language of the statute, can provide evidence of congressional intent

160. See Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 41, 47 (2008)
(evaluating "dueling" substantive canons of construction to determining applicability
of each canon to the interpretation of a particular statutory provision at issue). See
infra notes 208-17 and accompanying text.
161. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (noting that canons
are guides "designed to help judges determine the Legislature's intent" but "other
circumstances evidencing congressional intent can overcome their force"); see also
Shapiro, supra note 107, at 934 (noting that substantive canons serve to establish
presumptions or act as "tie-breakers" but allow a court to look at all of the relevant
information).
162. See, e.g., Bain & Colella, supra note 34, at 540-44 (discussing the evidence the
Supreme Court considered to determine whether a presumption of equitable tolling of
statute of limitations for claims against the United States was rebutted).
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to occupy a field. 163 With respect to conflict preemption, the
presumption against preemption is "readily overcome" if state law
requires something that the text of a federal law would prohibit or
federal law would prohibit something that state law requires. 164 Even
where federal and state law do not present a direct conflict in what
the law prohibits or allows, the operation of federal and state law may
otherwise conflict leading to the conclusion that the state law must
give way. For example, where federal and state laws provide
different statutes of limitations for the same cause of action, the
federal statute of limitations would preempt the state statute of
limitations for that action. 165
Courts frequently consult a statute's legislative history to determine
congressional intent, though some judges and commentators have
shunned its consideration. 166 Courts should evaluate legislative
history just like any other extra-textual evidence of congressional
intent and give it whatever weight it deserves. While an isolated
statement in a Committee report may not be very probative of the
intent of Congress, other parts of the legislative history may be quite
valuable in determining meaning.
For example, proposed
amendments to legislation, whether defeated or adopted, can
objectively show congressional intent in enacting legislation. How
congressional committees used terms in their deliberations and
reports can help determine the meaning of those terms in the
legislation if there is any ambiguity. 167 The titles and headings that
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 83, at 290-91 (stating their view that the intent to
occupy a field can only be derived "from the text of the federal laws and not from
such extraneous sources as legislative history").
164. See id. at 290.
165. See Poindexter v. United States, 64 7 F .2d 34, 36 (9th Cir. 1981 ).
166. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & Pus. POL'Y 61, 61-62 (1994); W. David Slawson,
Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of
Law, 44 STAN. L. REv. 383, 403-11 (1992); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About
the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 375 (1987); Adrian Verrneule,
Legislative History and the Limits ofJudicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy
Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1833, 1885-95 (1998). For a defense of reliance on
legislative history, see Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity:
Spirit, Letter, and History in Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 901, 95154 (2000). See also Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in
Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845, 848-61 (1992) (discussing the ways in
which legislative history can be useful in interpreting statutes); Eskridge, supra note
87, at 532 ("Doctrinally, the big debate has been whether interpretive context can
include the internal 'legislative history' preceding a statute's enactment into law.").
167. See Breyer, supra note 166, at 856-59.
163.
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Congress gave to certain provisions of legislation, even when not
incorporated into the United States Code, can provide insight into
meaning. 168 Legislative history is a fixture of statutory interpretation,
and one cannot cavalierly discard it. The answer to skeptics of
legislative history in statutory analysis is not to dismiss it entirely, but
to assess it critically and objectively to arrive at a fair determination
of congressional intent. Courts should assess the relevance and
reliability of each potentially probative indication of intent in the
history. When a court considers only those parts of the legislative
history that support a particular outcome or fails to evaluate the
probative weight of the history, one could conclude that the use of
history is a subterfuge for judicial policy-making rather than a search
for congressional intent.
Finally, a court may consider the evidence of congressional intent
in the underlying purpose of the federal statute. 169 Finding evidence
of legislative intent in a purpose, policy, or objective of a statute is
akin to interpreting a statute broadly to achieve its remedial purposes
under the remedial purpose canon. As with application of the
remedial purpose canon, there must be limits on the use of legislative
purposes as evidence of congressional intent to rebut an interpretive
presumption. Otherwise, legislative purpose is a convenient vehicle
for a court to insert its own notions of what Congress should have
provided in the legislation as a matter of policy when there is not a
clear expression in the text of the statute. 170 Before using a purpose
as evidence of congressional intent to aid in statutory interpretation, a
court should consider: whether the purpose is clearly articulated in
the legislation itself or in a reliable statement in the legislative
history; whether the purpose is an essential or dominant part of the
statute; and whether the purpose is sufficiently specific to place
reasonable parameters on interpretation. Lastly, the court should
consider whether the proposed interpretation of ambiguous statutory
language is necessary to achieving the purpose.

168. See infra text accompanying notes 239-241.
169. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
170. Professor Singer notes that courts and commentators have rejected this source of
legislative intent "on the ground that courts invade the legislative province when they
rely on their own notions of a law's spirit to extend or restrict application of a statute,"
yet acknowledges that "many American decisions have subscribed to the [equitable
interpretation] doctrine." See 28 SINGER & SINGER, supra note 83, § 54.3, at 402--06
(7th ed. 2012) (footnotes omitted).
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Articulating an Interpretive Approach for Determining Whether
Federal Law Preempts State Statutes of Repose.

Given these principles, the following interpretive approach
provides a systematic method for determining whether federal law
preempts state statutes of repose.
STEP 1. The court should first determine whether the text of the
federal statute expressly preempts state statutes of repose. If the plain
meaning of the text of the statute indicates that state statutes of repose
are preempted, the inquiry is complete. But, a court may also
determine that that the language of a statute expressly preempts state
statutes of repose through application of accepted text-based canons
of construction. So, a court should consider both the plain meaning
of statutory language and text-based canons of construction to
determine congressional intent before determining where there
should be any presumption regarding preemption. A court should
conclude its analysis at this first step only when consideration of the
text and text-based canons of construction resolves all ambiguity in
interpretation.
STEP 2. If the plain meaning of the text of the statute and
application of text-based canons of construction leave any ambiguity
regarding preemption of state statutes of repose-or if the text fails to
reference preemption at all-the court should consider whether there
should be a presumption regarding preemption based upon
substantive canons of construction. The court should consider all
arguably applicable substantive canons of construction and determine
the relative weight to give any competing inferences of meaning.
This analysis should consider both the nature of federal preemption
as it relates to the state interest represented by the statute of repose
and the specific purposes of the federal statute as they relate to state
repose provisions. The relevant questions a court should consider
are:
( 1) What weight should the court give a presumption against
preemption given the state interest represented by state statutes of
repose?
(2) Are there any substantive canons of construction relevant to the
purpose of the federal statute that provide inferences favoring or
disfavoring preemption, and, if so, how much weight should the court
give the inference?
(3) Considering the relative weight of inferences drawn from the
applicable substantive canons of construction, should the court adopt
an overall presumption to favor or disfavor preemption?
STEP 3. After determining whether there should be a presumption
regarding preemption, the court should consider other indications of
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congressional intent, including statutory context, legislative history,
and purposes of the statute to determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to overcome a presumption for or against preemption. The
relevant questions a court should consider if there is a presumption
against preemption are:
(1) Did Congress intend to occupy a field, thereby leaving no room
for operation of state statutes of repose? If not, would operation of
state statutes of repose present a direct conflict with federal law?
(2) Is there probative and reliable evidence in the legislative
history that leads to the conclusion that Congress intended to preempt
state statutes of repose through the federal legislation?
(3) Is preemption of state statutes of repose necessary to achieve a
purpose of the federal legislation? Is the purpose essential to, or
dominant feature of, the federal statute? Is the purpose specific?
(4) Is the evidence from statutory context, legislative history and
purposes strong enough to overcome a presumption against
preemption?
On the other hand, if there is a presumption in favor of preemption,
the relevant questions a court should consider are:
( 1) Did Congress leave room for operation of state statutes of
repose? If so, can state statutes of repose operate consistently with
federal law?
(2) Is there probative and reliable evidence in the legislative
history that leads to the conclusion that Congress did not intend to
preempt state statutes of repose through the federal legislation?
(3) Is preemption of state statutes of repose tangential to the
purposes ofthe federal legislation?
(4) Is the evidence from statutory context, legislative history and
purposes strong enough to overcome a presumption in favor of
preemption?
This systematic interpretive approach provides a rational and
objective basis for determining congressional intent regarding federal
preemption of state statutes of repose. Additionally, the approach
establishes a framework for analyzing court decisions that have
addressed the issue. The interpretive approach is not designed to
achieve a pre-ordained outcome, but rather has its basis in wellestablished case law and commentary regarding statutory
construction and federal preemption. As shown in the cases
discussed in subsequent sections, courts have used interpretive pieces
of this approach to analyze whether federal law preempts state
statutes of repose. 171 But, it is only through a systematic and holistic
171. See ilifra Part V.B.3.b.
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interpretation that courts can achieve consistent results that best
reflect congressional intent.
V. APPLYING THE INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK TO
EXISTING CONFLICTS IN FEDERAL LAW: CERCLA
A.

Determining Whether a Provision of CERCLA Expressly
Preempts State Statutes ofRepose

The federal courts are currently divided on whether a provision of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act preempts state statutes of repose for certain actions. 172
The dispute centers on an express preemption provision that was
added through the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986 (SARA). 173 This section provides:
(a) State statutes of limitations for hazardous substances
cases
(1) Exception to State statutes
In the case of any action brought under State law for
personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or
contributed to by exposure to any hazardous substance, or
pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment
from a facility, if the applicable limitations period for such
action (as specified in the State statute of limitations or
under common law) provides a commencement date which
is earlier than the federally required commencement date,
such period shall commence at the federally required
commencement date in lieu of the date specified in such
State statute.
(2) State law generally applicable
Except as provided in paragraph (1 ), the statute
limitations established under State law shall apply in
actions brought under State law for personal injury,
property damages, which are caused or contributed to
exposure to any hazardous substance, or pollutant

172. See i'!fra Part V.B.1-3.
173. See infra text accompanying note 182.

of
all
or
by
or
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contaminant, released into the environment from a
facility. 174
Subsection (1) of this of Section 9658(a) expressly preempts state
law under the specific conditions articulated in the paragraph. 175
Subsection (2) provides that state law will apply to actions which do
not meet the conditions of subsection (1 ). 176 Section 9658(b) provides
definitions for the conditions described in Section 9658(a)(1). 177 In
pertinent respect, it states that "[t]he term 'applicable limitations
period' means the period specified in a statute of limitations during
which a civil action referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section
may be brought." 178
Further, it provides that "[t]he term
'commencement date,' means the date specified in a statute of
limitations as the beginning of the applicable limitations period." 179
The "federally required commencement date" for statutes that meet
the other conditions of Section 9658(a)(l) is a discovery rule of
accrual that is set at "the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should
have known) that the personal injury or property damages referred to
in subsection (a)(1) of this section were caused or contributed to by
the hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concemed." 180
The necessary conditions for application of Section 9658(a)(1) are:
(1) an action is brought under state law for personal injury or
property damages;
(2) the injury or damages are caused or contributed to by exposure
to a hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant;
(3) the hazardous substance, pollutant or contaminant, was
released into the environment from a facility; and

174. 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a) (2006).
175. !d.
176. !d. § 9658(a)(2).
177. /d.§9658(b).
178. /d. § 9658(b)(2).
179. /d. § 9658(b)(3).
180. /d. § 9658(b)(4)(A). The section also provides "special rules" for the "federally
required commencement date" "[i]n the case of a minor or incompetent plaintiff." !d.
§ 9658(b)(4)(B). Notably, this federally-required commencement date provides a
discovery rule which delays accrual until a plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have
known) that an injury was caused by exposure to a hazardous substance or pollutant.
Because accrual is based on discovery of both the injury and its cause, the rule is more
generous to plaintiffs than a discovery rule of accrual that is triggered by discovery of
injury alone. See SUPERFUND SECTION 301(E) STUDY GRP., 97TH CONG., INJURIES AND
DAMAGES FROM HAzARDoUS WASTES-ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL
REMEDIES, at 28-29 (Comm. Print 1982) (discussing different types of discovery rules
of accrual adopted by the states).
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(4) the applicable limitations period for such action (as specified in
the State statute of limitations or under common law) provides a
commencement date which is earlier than the federally required
commencement date. 181
The question of whether Section 9658(a)(l) expressly preempts
state statutes of repose involves only an the interpretation of whether
this last condition applies to state statutes of repose. 182
!.Considering the Plain Meaning of the Provision and TextBased Canons of Construction
The first interpretive question is whether the plain meaning of "the
applicable limitations period ... as specified in the State statute of
limitations or under common law" 183 includes the period mandated by
a state statute of repose. The term "applicable limitations period" is
also defined as "the period specified in a statute of limitations." 184
Thus, the question is whether the plain meaning of "the period
specified" in a "statute of limitations" (which could include a period
specified in "the State statute of limitations or under common law")
would include the period set by a state statute of repose, thereby
mandating preemption of state statutes of repose.
Resolving this question one way or the other is not as easy as it
may first appear. The first plain meaning question is whether the
term "statute of limitations" can encompass both statutes of
limitations and statutes of repose. As shown earlier, the terms are
presently distinct, but that has not always been the case. Under the
text-based, fixed-meaning canon, the relevant time to consider the
meaning of the terms is in 1986, the date of the enactment of Section
9658(a)(1). 185 At that time, the most recent edition of Black's Law
Dictionary from 1979 had not yet adopted separate entries for
"statutes of limitations" and "statutes of repose," as exist in all
181. 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(l) (2006).
182. For an early discussion of the preemptive scope of this section, particularly with
respect to the first three conditions, see Van R. Delhotal, Re-examining CERCLA
Section 309: Federal Preemption of State Limitations Periods, 34 WASHBURN L.J.
415, 443-53 (1995). The author does not focus on preemption of state statutes of
repose, and without a detailed analysis, simply concludes "[b]roadly construed,
section 309 must apply to statutes of repose as well as statutes of limitations. It
simply defeats congressional intent to hold otherwise; statutes of repose were
specifically identified as part of the problem by the Study Group and adopted [sic] by
Congress." !d. at 457.
183. 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1).
184. !d. § 9658(b)(2).
185. !d. § 9658; ScALIA & GARNER, supra note 83, at 78.
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subsequent editions! 86 This edition of Black's Law Dictionary
defined "statutes of limitations," as:
A statute prescribing limitations to the right of action on
certain described causes of action or criminal prosecutions;
that is, declaring that no suit shall be maintained on such
causes of action, nor any criminal charge be made, unless
brought within a specified period of time after the right
accrued. Statutes of limitation are statutes of repose, and are
such legislative enactments as prescribe the periods within
which actions may be brought upon certain claims or within
which certain rights may be enforced. In criminal cases,
however, a statute of limitation is an act of grace, a
surrendering by sovereign of its right to prosecute. 187
This definition is notable in several respects. First, it does not
recognize the present distinct meanings of statutes of limitations and
statutes of repose. Instead, it speaks in terms of bringing a suit within
a certain period of time after a "right accrued." 188 This is a concept
that is focused on the recipient of the right to sue and is relevant only
to statutes of limitations. The definition does not encompass a time
period which is triggered by a defined event related to the
defendant's conduct, which is a unique characteristic of the modem
meaning of "statutes of repose." 189 As with many definitions of
statutes of limitations, this definition notes that statute of limitations

186.

Compare BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 835 (5th ed. 1979) with BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1546 (9th ed. 2009), BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1450-51 (8th ed. 2004),
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1422-23 (7th ed. 1999), BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 927,
1411 (6th ed. 1990). The sixth edition of Black's Law Dictionary in 1990 first
specifically defined a "statute of repose" as a term of art distinct from a statute of
limitations and noted distinguishing characteristics between the two--both in the
entry for "statute of limitations" and in the entry for "statute of repose." See BLACK's
LAW DICTIONARY 927, 1411 (6th ed. 1990). For example, the entry for statute of
repose states that it differs from a statute of limitations because it "cuts off right of
action after specified time measured from delivery of product or completion of work,
regardless of time of accrual of cause of action or of notice of invasion of legal
rights." /d. at 1411.
187. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 835 (5th ed. 1979).
188. /d.
189. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1423 (7th ed. 1999) (defining a statute of repose as a
statute that "bars a suit a fixed number of years after the defendant acts in some
way"); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1411 (6th ed. 1990) (defining the statute of repose
as a statute the "cuts off right of action after specified time measured from delivery of
product or completion of work").
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"are statutes of repose." 190 But, this is best understood as describing a
function of statutes of limitations, namely, providing repose, rather
than stating that statutes of limitations are synonymous with statutes
of repose, or are a subset of statutes of repose. The definition does
not recognize the distinct modem function of statutes of repose or
show that such statutes fit within the definition of traditional statutes
of limitations. 191
As of 1979, however, the second Restatement of Torts recognized
the operational distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes
of repose:
In recent years special "statutes of repose" have been
adopted in some states covering particular kinds of activity,
such as professional negligence for doctors, lawyers or
architects, or products liability, or liability of building
contractors. These statutes set a designated event for the
statutory period to start running and then provide that at the
expiration of the period any cause of action is barred
regardless of usual reasons for "tolling" the statute. The
statutory period in these acts is usually longer than that for
the regular statute of limitations, but, depending upon the
designated event starting the running of the statute, it may
have run before a cause of action came fully into
existence .... 192
Several cases from 1986 and earlier also show that there was an
understanding of the difference between statutes of limitations and
statutes of repose at the time Section 9658 was enacted. 193
Assuming that "statute of repose" was a distinct term of art that did
not come within the meaning of "statute of limitations" in 1986, a

190. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 835 (5th ed. 1979).
191. See Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d. 434, 449 (4th Cir. 2013) (Thacker, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3130 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2014) (No. 13-339)
("Notably, this defmition does not adopt the inverse proposition that all statutes of
repose are also statutes of limitation.").
192. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS § 899 cmt. g (1979).
193. See, e.g., Hatcher v. Allied Prods. Corp., 796 F.2d 1427, 1428 (lith Cir. 1986);
McMahon v. Eli Lilly & Co., 774 F.2d 830, 836--37 (7th Cir. 1985); Yarbro v. Hilton
Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822, 825 (Colo. 1982); Daily v. New Britain Mach. Co., 512
A.2d 893, 904 (Conn. 1986); Universal Eng'g Corp. v. Perez, 451 So.2d 463, 465-66
(Fla. 1984); Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 699, 501 A.2d 27, 32 (1985); Klein v.
Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514, 516 (Mass. 1982); Cavanaugh v. Abbott Labs., 496 A.2d
154, 161-62 (Vt. 1985).
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second plain meaning question is whether statutes of repose are
covered by Section 9658(a)(l) as a "limitations period" that is
"specified in a statute of limitations." There is no doubt that a statute
of repose is a limitations period, and it is often specified within a
provision that is designated as a "statute of limitations," providing the
outer temporal boundary of potential liability. If Section 965 8(a)( 1)
referenced multiple limitations periods as "specified in a statute of
limitations," then the plain meaning of the provision may more
readily include statutes of repose. 194 But, the period that Section
9658(a)(l) references is singular-"the applicable limitations
period"-likely referencing only the traditional limitations period
that is triggered by the date of the plaintiffs injury or by a discovery
rule.J9s
Thus, considering the plain meaning of Section 9658(a)(l), and
applying the fixed-meaning of the terms at the relevant time, the
language does not show a clear intent of Congress to preempt state
statutes of repose. There are, however, some additional contextual
clues to meaning which a court should consider under the whole-text
canon. First, the preemptive effect of the section is to provide a later
commencement date for statutes of limitations in circumstances
where the commencement date under state law would be earlier. In
those cases, the "federally required commencement date" is a
discovery rule of accrual, focusing on the recipient of the right of
action, and triggering the time period on a date the plaintiff had, or
should have had, certain knowledge. Therefore, context points to a
commencement date focused on the accrual of a right to plaintiff
rather than to a commencement date tied to the conduct of the

194. It is hard to imagine why Congress would have the preemptive effect of Section
9658(a)(l) turn on whether the limitations period of statute of repose was included
within a statute of limitations, given that a statute of repose could be a stand-alone
provision. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 12.115 (2013). So, even if the statute
referenced multiple limitations period, this might not have reflected the intent of
Congress to preempt statutes of repose.
195. See also 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(2) (2006) (defming "applicable limitations period" as
"the period specified in a statute of limitations"); id. § 9658(b)(3) (defining
commencement date as "the date specified in a statute of limitations") (emphasis
added). Although a singular article is often riot limited to the singular construction for
purposes of statutory interpretation, see I U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (pluralization rule of the
Dictionary Act), the context, here, suggests that it is. See id. (stating that context may
show that singular words do not apply to several things). The Supreme Court has
stated that the pluralization rule of the Dictionary Act "is not one to be applied except
where it is necessary to carry out the evident intent of the statute." First Nat' I Bank in
St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640,657 (1924); see also United States v. Hayes, 555
U.S. 415,422 n.5 (2009).
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defendant. The statute's reference to displacement of "the date"
specified in "the limitations period" would further support an
interpretation focused exclusively on the date of accrual, and
therefore preempting only state statutes of limitations and not statutes
of repose.
Another contextual consideration is CERCLA's savings clause,
which provides, in part, that "[n]othing in this chapter shall affect or
modify in any way the obligations or liabilities of any person under
other Federal or State law, including common law, with respect to
releases of hazardous substances or other pollutants or
contaminants." 196 Because the savings clause reflects an intent to
preserve substantive rights, 197 interpreting this provision contextually
with Section 9658(a)(l) would recommend limiting the preemptive
effect of Section 9658(a) to procedural statutes of limitations and not
extending it to statutes of repose, which establish substantive
rights. 198
One cannot support an interpretation applying the preemptive scope
of Section 9658(a)(l) to state statutes of repose by reference to any
other text-based canon. Obviously, under the negative implication
canon, if statutes of limitations and statutes of reposes are considered
distinct concepts, then the inclusion of statutes of limitations in the
text of the statute would give rise to the inference that statutes of
repose are not preempted. Because the plain meaning of Section
9658(a)(l)--considered in conjunction with text-based canons of
construction--does not clearly support applying the preemptive
effect of Section 9658(a)(l) to state statutes of repose, the next step
in the analysis is to consider the substantive canons of construction
and determine whether they give rise to any inference regarding
preemption.

196. 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) (2006).
197. See Delhotal, supra note 182, at 452 ("The plain language of the savings clause
indicates that CERCLA does not change substantive rights or obligations.").
198. See Alfred R. Light, New Federalism, Old Due Process, and Retroactive Revival:
Constitutional Problems with CERCLA 's Amendment of State Law, 40 U. KAN. L.
REv. 365, 406-07 (1992) (suggesting that CERCLA's preemption of state statutes of
limitations can be reconciled with its savings clause if it is interpreted to preempt only
state "statutes of limitations that are procedural (affect the remedy) but not those that
are substantive (affect the liability)"). In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529
U.S. 861, 868 (2000), the Supreme Court relied on a savings clause to support a
narrow reading of an express preemption provision.
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2.Reconciling Competing Substantive Canons of Construction
Two competing substantive canons of construction are relevant to
whether Section 9658 preempts state statutes of repose. First, the
presumption against preemption canon most certainly applies because
a state statute of repose creates a substantive right of immunity from
tort liability after the passage of a certain amount of time from the
allegedly wrongful conduct. The determination of tort rights and
immunities is a matter of traditional state authority to which a
presumption against preemption applies when there is ambiguity in
statutory text. 199
Second, the remedial purpose canon may apply given that
CERCLA is a remedial statute. 20° Considering the limitations on the
remedial purpose canon that Professor Watson identified/01 however,
it appears that at least two of the limitations would disfavor
application of the canon to support a broad interpretation of Section
9658 to preempt state statutes of repose. For one thing, Section 9658
likely reflected a legislatively-crafted compromise, and an
interpretation extending preemption to state statutes of repose would
upset that compromise. 202 As described in more detail below,
Congress commissioned a study group to evaluate statutory and
common law remedies for injuries caused by exposure to hazardous
substances.Z03 The study group made many recommendations, but the
only revision affecting state law that Congress implemented was the
federally required commencement date for accrual of state statutes of
limitations. 204 Additionally, applying the remedial purpose canon to
preempt state statutes of repose would conflict with the presumption
against preemption canon; Professor Watson noted that the remedial

199.
200.

20 l.
202.

203.
204.

See supra text accompanying notes 136-40.
See, e.g., Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1081 (9th Cir.
2006) (applying the remedial purpose canon to interpretation of a provision of
CERCLA because of "CERCLA's overwhelmingly remedial statutory scheme")
(internal quotation marks omitted); Sierra Club v. Seaboard Farms Inc., 387 F.3d
1167, 1172 {lOth Cir. 2004) (stating that CERCLA "must be interpreted liberally so as
to accomplish its remedial goals").
See supra text accompanying notes 150-51.
See Watson, supra note 83, at 301 ("For the most part, the federal district and
appellate courts have properly recognized that the remedial purpose canon has
diminished utility when the interpretive issue focuses on provisions of CERCLA that
are the product of compromise.").
See infra text accompanying notes 220-25.
See infra text accompanying notes 224-28.
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purpose canon generally gives way when it comes into conflict with
an important competing interpretive principle. 205
In addition to the limitations on the canon that Professor Watson
identified, it is difficult to conclude that that the preemption of state
statutes of repose is related to a remedial purpose of CERCLA.
Congress enacted CERCLA to provide fmancing to remediate
hazardous waste sites and to apportion the costs of cleanup to those
responsible for contamination. 206 Even considering the purpose of
Section 9658 in isolation, preemption of state statutes of repose can
only be related to the purpose of that section if the purpose is defined
very broadly in terms that the language of the section itself does not
support. The specific purpose of Section 9658 is to provide a
federally required commencement date where a state statute of
limitations without a similar discovery rule of accrual would bar the
action. 207 Congress has never identified the remedial purpose of
Section 9658 as the removal of all state temporal barriers to recovery
for damages caused by hazardous wastes. Thus, while there is good
reason to apply the presumption against preemption canon because
statutes of repose represent substantive law in an area of traditional
state authority, there are limitations that recommend against
application of the remedial purpose canon.
The Supreme Court's decision in Florida Department ofRevenue v.
Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. 208 provides insight regarding how a court
might reconcile competing canons of construction. In that case, the
Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a provision of the
Bankruptcy Code that provided a stamp-tax exemption from state
taxes for any asset transferred "under a plan confirmed under
[Chapter 11]" of the Code exempted assets transferred after a filing
for bankruptcy but prior to the confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan. 209
The Court found that there were two plausible interpretations of the
205. See Watson, supra note 83, at 306-08 (noting that "courts construing CERCLA
should be wary of an uncritical endorsement of the [remedial purpose] canon in
situations that involve competing interpretive 'meta-principles"' and identifying the
"American rule" for recovery of attorney's fees, and the presumption against "waivers
of sovereign immunity" canon as two such meta-principles).
206. See Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 438 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Metro.
Water Reclamation Dist. v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc., 473 F.3d 824, 82627 (7th Cir. 2007)), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3130 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2014) (No. 13339).
207. 42 U.S.C. § 9658 (2006).
208. 554 U.S. 33, 35, 38-41 (2008) (interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 1146(a) (Supp. V)), rev'd sub
nom. In re Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 548 F.3d 960 (11th Cir. 2008).
209. Id. at 35-38.
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text, though the better interpretation limited the exemption to postconfirmation transfers made under the authority of a confirmed
plan. 210 Additionally, considering the Bankruptcy Code as a whole,
the Court concluded that there was greater contextual support for the
interpretation that a confirmed plan must precede the transfer for the
exemption to apply. 211 Nevertheless, because each party claimed that
substantive canons of construction supported its respective
interpretation, the Court considered what it called the "dueling
canons of construction."212
The Florida Department of Revenue, which was arguing that the
exemption did not apply to a transfer unless there was a confirmed
plan, appealed to a canon akin to the presumption against preemption
canon: namely, that Congress must clearly express an exemption
from state taxation, and therefore the provision must be construed
strictly to prevent unwarranted displacement of state tax laws. 213 On
the other hand, the debtor urged the Court to employ the remedial
purpose canon to broadly construe the exemption, contending that the
Bankruptcy Code is a remedial statute and the obvious purpose of the
exemption was to facilitate the Chapter 11 process by granting tax
relief. 214 The Court carefully considered the applicability of both
canons and found the "federalism" canon that the Florida Department
of Revenue urged was "decisive" because recognizing an exemption
for pre-confirmation transfers would be recognizing an exemption
that Congress had not "clearly expressed," which is precisely what
the canon counseled against. 215 On the other hand, interpreting the
provision broadly through the remedial purpose canon to apply the
exemption to pre-confirmation transfers would be "beyond what the
210.
211.
212.
213.

Jd. at 38-41.

Id.at41-45.
Id.at47.
See id. at 48 (citing Nat'l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S.
582, 590 (1995); Cal. State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U.S. 844,
851-52 (1989)). The Florida Department of Revenue also invoked the canon that
Congress is presumed to be aware of a judicial interpretation of a statute and adopt
that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change; it argued that this canon
also supported its position because the provision had remained unchanged through
several revisions of the Bankruptcy Code, including a revision after court decisions
interpreting the statute to require a post-confirmation transfer for the exemption. Jd.
at 47-48.
214. Id. at 49. The debtor also appealed to the "absurdity" doctrine, arguing that it would
be an absurd policy to allow pre-confirmation transfers to be taxed but to exempt
others made moments later. Jd. at 52. The Court responded that it saw no absurdity in
setting forth a simple bright-line rule, and it was for the legislature, not the courts, to
determine whether the provision needed revision based upon "practical realities." Jd.
215. Jd. at 50-51.
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statutory text can naturally bear," and cannot be tied to a particular
congressional purpose in enacting Chapter 11. 216 In rejecting the
remedial purpose canon, the Court recognized that Chapter 11 struck
a balance of several interests: those of the debtor in restructuring
debt, those of creditors in maximizing the value of the bankruptcy
estate, and those of the state in determining property rights in the
assets of a debtor's estate pursuant to state law. 217
Likewise, with respect to interpreting the preemptive reach of
Section 9658, the presumption against preemption canon would take
precedence over the remedial purpose canon in considering "dueling
canons of construction." As the Court concluded in considering the
"federalism" canon in Piccadilly Cafeterias, a construction of Section
9658 to preempt state statutes of repose would extend the preemptive
reach of the provision beyond what Congress had clearly expressed;
this would be an interpretation that favors rather than disfavors
preemption, which is directly contrary to the prescription of the
presumption against preemption canon. 218 And, for the same reasons
that the remedial purpose canon did not apply in Piccadilly
Cafeterias, it should not apply to the CERCLA preemption provision:
construing Section 9658 to preempt state statutes of repose would go
beyond what the text of Section 9658 can "naturally bear," and
preemption of state statutes of repose cannot be tied to a specific
remedial purpose of CERCLA. To complete the comparison, as
shown below, 219 Section 9658 of CERCLA, like Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, reflected a legislative compromise and balancing
of interests.
3 .Determining Whether There Is Sufficient Evidence of
Congressional Intent to Rebut the Presumption against
Preemption
The fmal step in the interpretive process is to determine whether
there is any evidence of congressional intent to overcome a
presumption against preemption. First, the statutory context of
CERCLA, applying the doctrines of field preemption and conflict
preemption, does not indicate congressional intent to preempt state
statutes of repose for tort actions claiming damages from releases of

ld. at 51.
ld. (citing Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443,
450-51 (2007)).
218. ld. at 50; see Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70,77 (2008).
219. See infra text accompanying notes 236-43.
216.
217.
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hazardous substances. Congress, through CERCLA and SARA, did
not intend to occupy the field of remedies for releases of hazardous
substances; it did not seek to provide a federal compensatory damage
remedy for personal injuries or property damages resulting from
hazardous waste releases, let alone displace state law. There is also
no conflict in allowing state statutes of repose to operate in
conjunction with application of Section 9658 to determine the date of
accrual for state statutes of limitations.
The legislative history of Section 9658, however, provides some
clues to congressional intent regarding its preemptive reach. In 1980,
CERCLA established a group (Study Group) to examine the
"adequacy of existing common law and statutory remedies in
providing legal redress for harm to man and the environment caused
by the release of hazardous substances into the environment."220 This
included, among other things, evaluating "barriers to recovery posed
by existing statutes oflimitations."221 The Study Group, consisting of
"a distinguished panel of lawyers" designated by various bar
organizations, 222 responded with a detailed report (Study Group
Report) including recommendations for improving remedies under
CERLA. 223
The Study Group Report contained ten
recommendations, 224 including one recommendation calling for a

220. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)(l) (2006). By reference to the authorizing Section ofCERCLA,
Section 301(e), this group is sometimes referenced as the Section 301(e) Study Group,
and their report is sometimes referenced as the Section 301 (e) Study Group Report.
221. !d. § 9651(e)(3)(F).
222. See id. § 9651(e)(2); H.R. REP. No. 99-962, at 261(1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3354.
223. SUPERFUND SECTION 301(E) STUDY GRP., 97TH CONG., INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM
HAzARDOUS WASTES-ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES, S. DOC.
No. 97-571 (Comm. Print 1982).
224. !d. at 181-256. "Tier I" recommendations were the first eight recommendations of
the Study Group and encompassed a remedial program to provide remedies for
injuries from exposure to hazardous waste. !d. at 181-239. The program included
establishing a federal administrative remedy through a claims process, which would
be "more prompt and less costly than tort litigation." /d. at 181. A "Tier 2"
recommendation, the ninth recommendation, was to keep intact "the existing system
of tort law in the several states, with some recommendations for procedural and other
improvement." /d. at 182, 240-51. A majority of the Study Group agreed that a
claimant who obtained compensation under Tier 1 should be free to pursue a tort
remedy under state tort law; however, the award should be reduced by the amount
recovered under Tier I, and the claimant should be liable for costs if the recovery is
less than the Tier I amount. !d. at 182-83. The tenth recommendation concerned
state court actions for property damages from hazardous waste activities. /d. at 25256.
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number of changes related to state law. 225 With respect to state
statutes of limitations, the Study Group Report noted that injuries
related to exposures to hazardous waste often had long latency
periods; consequently, when a state statute of limitations starts to run
under a traditional accrual rule (for example, when a plaintiff is first
injured by exposure), the statute of limitations will bar most potential
claims for injuries related to those exposures before a plaintiff is even
aware of the injury. 226 The Study Group concluded that "[s]tates can
reduce the statutes of limitation barrier by adopting a discovery rule,
if they have not done so already."227 Thus, the Study Group Report
made the following recommendation regarding statutes of limitations:
A small number of states still follow the so-called traditional
rule that the cause of action accrues from the time of
exposure. Another small number of states has not as yet
clearly adopted either the traditional or the discovery rule ..
. The Study Group recommends that all states that have not
already done so, clearly adopt the rule that an action accrues
when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the
injury or disease and its cause. The Recommendation is
intended also to cover the repeal of the statutes of repose
which, in a number of states have the same effect as some
statutes of limitation in barring plaintiffs claim before he
knows that he has one. 228
In 1986, Congress passed SARA, adopting Section 9658 as an
amendment to CERCLA, along with many other amendments. 229 The
addition of Section 9658 was included in Section 203 of SARA,
entitled "State Procedural Reform.'mo The section of the House
Conference Report on the legislation (House Report), reflecting the
225.

226.
227.
228.

229.
230.

!d. at 240--51. This ninth recommendation of the Study Group included proposals for
changes to state law beyond changes to statutes of limitations, including: changing
joinder rules, adopting strict liability provisions for hazardous waste activities, and
implementing certain evidentiary presumptions. See id.
!d. at 28.
!d. at 117.
!d. at 240--41. In a subsequent "Discussion" of this recommendation, the Study Group
Report states that the "Study Group agreed not only that the discovery rule should be
applicable, but also in the view that a formulation of the discovery rule be applied that
provides that an action accrues when the plaintiff knows, or should know, of the
injury or illness, and also of its cause." !d. at 246.
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 203,
100 Stat. 1613, 1695-96 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9658 (2006)).
!d.
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adoption of the amendment, noted that the amendment provided for a
federal commencement date for state statutes of limitations for
exposure to a hazardous substance. 231 The House Report stated that
state statutes of limitations "defme the time in which an injured party
may bring a lawsuit seeking compensation for his injuries," and
"usually run from two to four years, depending on the State."232 The
House Report noted that a plaintiff with a long-latency disease may
have a claim barred by the statute of limitations if it begins to run at
the time of the first injury. 233 Further, the House Report stated that
the Study Group Report found that "certain State statutes deprive
plaintiffs of their day in court," and "the problem centers around
when the statute of limitations begins to run rather than the number of
years it runs." 234 The House Report then stated "[t]his section
addresses the problem identified in the [Study Group Report]." 235
There is no reference in the House Report to statutes of repose.
Thus, if anything, the legislative history of Section 9658 supports a
conclusion that the preemptive effect of Section 9658 should be
limited to state statutes of limitations. The Study Group Report
contained many recommendations.
In discussing statutes of
limitations and statutes of repose separately, the Study Group Report
showed that lawyers understood the difference in the use of those
terms at the time. 236 Of all of the recommendations in the Study
Group Report, the only change to state law referenced in the House
Report is the change to "statutes of limitations."237 Reading the full
context of the House Report shows that "the problem" that Section
H.R. REP. No. 99-962, at 261 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3276,3354.
232. /d.
233. /d.
234. /d.
235. /d.
236. See Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 451 (4th Cir. 2013) (Thacker, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the Study Group Report, in discussing both statutes of
limitations and statutes of repose, "put Congress on notice that statutes of limitations
are distinct time-bars, separate from statutes of repose, even if they have the same
effect"), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3130 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2014) (No. 13-339).
237. SUPERFUND SECTION 30l(E) STUDY GRP., 97TH CONG., INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM
HAzARDOUS WASTES-ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES, S. DOC.
No. 97-571, at 240-41 (Comm. Print 1982). In fact, the Study Group Report did not
recommended any changes to federal law to deal with limitations issues. Instead, it
recommended that the states adopt a discovery rule for their statutes of limitations so
that a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered
the injury or disease and its cause; it further recommended that the states repeal
statutes of repose. /d. at 240-41; see also Light, supra note 198, at 3 71 ("The Study
Group did not, however, recommend that Congress enact legislation in this area.").
231.
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9658 addressed was that statutes of limitations started to run at the
time of "the first injury."238 This is not a feature of statutes of repose.
Significantly, Section 203 of SARA, which contained what became
Section 9658, was entitled "State Procedural Reform." 239 Even
though this title was not incorporated into the United States Code/40
it shows intent to reform state procedures, such as state statutes of
limitations, and not to preempt state substantive rights, such as those
established by state statutes of repose. 241
Section 9658 clearly reflects a legislative compromise. Not only
did Congress fail to enact any ·of the specific the recommendations of
the Study Group Report-the only recommendation relating to
statutes of limitations was that states change their laws, not that
Congress preempt state law-242 but Congress had also rejected
various legislative proposals for independent federal causes of action
for injuries caused by releases of hazardous substances. 243 Congress
left the state tort system to act independently to provide remedies for
personal injuries and property damages caused by releases of
hazardous substances, with the only change being the establishment
238.

239.
240.
241.

242.
243.

See H.R. REP. No. 99-962, at 261 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3354. That the focus of the Study Group was on statutes of
limitations is shown by its survey of the statutes of limitations for each state that noted
whether the state employed a discovery rule of accrual. S. Doc. No. 97-571, app. 12,
15-18 (REPORT ON STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS APPLICABLE TO ACTIONS ARISING OUT
OF HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL). The survey noted that several states that had
codified a discovery rule of accrual had also codified a statute of repose to place an
outer boundary on liability. See id. at App. 19-23 (describing statutes in Connecticut,
Kansas, and North Carolina).
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 203,
100 Stat. 1613, 1695 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9658 (2006)).
See 42 U.S.C. § 9658. The title of Section 9658 is "Actions under State law for
damages from exposure to hazardous substances."
See Light, supra note 198, at 406--07 (stating that this title "hints that the statute
amends statutes of limitations that are procedural (affect the remedy) but not those
that are substantive (affect the liability)"); see also supra text accompanying notes
103-18 (discussing the "title-and-headings" canon, through which the title or heading
of a provision can be a permissible indicator of meaning to resolve any ambiguity).
Because the heading was not codified in the statute, consideration of the heading does
not rise to the level of a text-based canon of construction in the interpretive analysis.
Nevertheless, the heading is relevant as part of the legislative history of Section 9658
to determine congressional intent in resolving any textual ambiguity in the section.
See supra text accompanying notes 227-28.
See Light, supra note 198, at 371 (calling Section 9658 the "Dead Duck" Compromise
and noting that "[d]uring the reauthorization of CERCLA, both the Senate and the
House of Representatives considered and rejected proposals to establish a federal
cause of action for personal injury and property damage in environmental cases").
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of a uniform discovery rule of accrual for actions meeting the
conditions of Section 9658.
B.

Evaluating Federal Circuit Decisions Determining Whether
CERCLA Preempts Statutes ofRepose

Federal decisions that have decided whether Section 9658 preempts
state statutes of repose have often employed parts of the interpretive
analysis proposed here, but none have followed a holistic approach
considering and balancing all relevant factors in the analysis. 244 The
first circuit court to address the issue found that CERCLA did not
preempt statutes of repose; 245 the second decision reached the
opposite conclusion. 246 In the most recent circuit decision, a majority
of the three-judge panel found that CERCLA preempted the state
statutes of repose, but a dissenting judge disagreed. 247 Evaluating
these decisions in light of the proposed interpretive approach
provides insight into the interpretive process.
1. Burlington Northern: Determining Meaning from the Text of
the Statute without Considering Canons of Construction
The first federal circuit court of appeals to directly address the
issue was the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Burlington Northern
& Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. Poole Chemical Co. 248 The litigation
arose after the January 2003 rupture of a chemical storage tank
244. Federal district courts have also addressed the issue. See, e.g., Mechler v. United
States, No. 12-2283-EFM, 2013 WL 3989640, at *7-8 (D. K.an. Aug. 2, 2013);
Evans v. Walter Indus. Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1362-64 (N.D. Ala. 2008);
German ex rei. Grace v. CSX Transp., Inc., 510 F. Supp. 2d 630, 633-34 (S.D. Ala.
2007); A.S.I., Inc. v. Sanders, 835 F. Supp. 1349, 1358-59 (D. K.an. 1993). Given the
split in the federal circuit court decisions, the article only discusses the appellate
opinions in the text.
245. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Poole Chern. Co., 419 F.3d 355, 358 (5th Cir.
2005).
246. McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 782 (9th Cir. 2008).
247. Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 445 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82
U.S.L.W. 3130 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2014) (No. 13-339); see also id. at 448 (Thacker, J.,
dissenting).
248. 419 F.3d 355. Other circuit courts have considered the preemptive reach of Section
9658(a)(1) but have not based their decisions on whether the terms of the statute
encompassed state statutes of repose. See, e.g., First United Methodist Church of
Hyattsville v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 868 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that
Section 9658 did not preempt a state statute of repose because CERCLA did not apply
to an asbestos removal action); Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc., 860 F.2d 1434, 1435-36
(7th Cir. 1988) (holding that Section 9658 did not preempt a state statute of repose
because plaintiff's claim involved an exposure to asbestos and not a release of a
hazardous substance covered by CERCLA).

2014]

Federal Law and State Statutes of Repose

171

manufactured by the Skinner Tank Company (Skinner) and sold in
1988 to the Poole Chemical Company (Poole). 249 The Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company conducted an emergency
clean-up of the spill and sought to recover its costs from Poole? 50
Poole filed a third-party claim against Skinner alleging that the tank
was defective. 251 The district court dismissed the third-party claim
based on Texas's fifteen-year statute of repose for product liability
actions. 252
On appeal, Poole argued, among other things, that Section 9658
preempted the statute of repose. 253 The court disagreed. Starting
with the plain language of the statute, the court noted that Section
9658 only specified statutes of limitations, not statutes of repose; the
court found that statutes of repose were distinct from statutes of
limitations and were therefore not covered. 254 The court, however,
did not consider what the terms "statute of limitations" and "statute
of repose" meant in 1986 under the fixed-meaning canon or why a
statute of repose could not qualify as "the limitations period specified
in a statute of limitations." Nor did the court consider any other textbased canons of construction.
With respect to substantive canons of construction, the court did
not apply, or even acknowledge, the substantive presumption against
preemption canon or the remedial purpose canon, perhaps because it
found that the issue was resolved through its analysis of the text.
Nevertheless, the court considered the purposes of CERCLA
generally and of Section 9658 in particular. The court stated that the
purpose of CERCLA was '"to facilitate the prompt cleanup of
hazardous waste sites,"' and to shift the costs of environmental
cleanup to responsible parties. 255 The court then noted that Section
9658 was not originally part of CERCLA but was added in 1986 to
249.
250.
251.
252.

Burlington N & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 419 F.3d at 358.
Jd.
Jd.
Jd. (district court dismissal based on TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
16.012(b)).
253. Id. at 359-{;3.
254. Id. at 362-{;4 ("[A] statute of repose establishes a 'right not to be sued,' rather than a
'right to sue.'"). The Supreme Court of South Dakota agreed with Burlington
Northern's interpretation of the plain language of Section 9658, finding that it only
preempted state statutes of limitations and noting that "Congress failed to include
substantively different statutes of repose within [the] preemptive rule." Clark Cnty. v.
Sioux Equip. Corp., 2008 SD 60, 'If 22-28,753 N.W.2d 406,414-17.
255. Burlington N & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 419 F.3d at 364 (quoting OHM Remediation Servs.
v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574, 1578 (5th Cir. 1997)).
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address a congres~ional concern that "many state systems were
inadequate to deal with the delayed discovery of the effect of a
release of a toxic substance."256 Based on the House Report, the court
recognized a particular congressional concern that when a state
statute of limitations runs from the date of the first injury, rather than
from the time that a plaintiff discovers that the injury was caused by a
hazardous substance, it will bar the claims of a plaintiff with "a longlatency disease like cancer. " 257 The court found that Congress met
this concern by preempting state statutes of limitations that would
prevent plaintiffs who suffered from latent diseases from pursuing an
action. 258 Thus, the court reasoned, finding preemption of statutes of
limitations but not statutes of repose comported with "common
sense"-"a fundamental principle of statutory construction,"particularly for a case that did not involve a long-latency disease or
an inherently undiscoverable injury. 259
A problem with the court's analysis in Burlington Northern is the
court's failure to recognize that the logical consequence of its
statutory construction would be to cut off claims for persons with
long-latency diseases and inherently undiscoverable injuries. The
court took comfort in the fact that this was not the consequence of its
decision given the facts of the case; but, had Poole bought its storage
tanks just one year earlier, the statute of repose would have expired,
barring Poole's claim before it could possibly have learned of its
injury (when one of the tanks ruptured). 260 By failing to engage in a
complete interpretive analysis--considering all of the potentially
applicable canons of construction and all of the relevant evidence of

256. !d. (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-962, at 261 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3354).
257. !d. (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-962, at 261 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3354).
258. !d.
259. !d. at 364-65. The court noted that Poole knew about the injury as soon as the tank
ruptured (in January 2003) and knew of the Texas legislature's passage of the product
liability statute of repose no later than its effective date of September 1, 2003. !d. at
358, 365. Therefore, because the storage tanks were sold to Poole on October 28,
1988, Poole, knowing of its injury, still had almost two months to file its third party
complaint before it would be barred by the fifteen-year statute of repose. See id. at
358-59, 365. Instead, Poole waited sixteen months after the injury to file a third-party
complaint. !d. at 365.
260. Because the applicable Texas statute of repose was effective only to actions filed on
or after July 1, 2003, Poole theoretically had a short window after the rupture to file a
claim before the statute of repose became effective. See id. at 358-59. A previous
version of this product liability statute of repose applied only to manufacturers of
manufacturing equipment. !d. at 359 n.4.
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congressional intent in the legislative history-the court failed fully
to justify an interpretation that would lead to this result.
2. McDonald: Finding Textual Ambiguity, but Failing to
Consider Canons of Construction and Selectively Reading the
Legislative History
The next federal circuit court of appeals to address the issue was
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in McDonald v. Sun Oil Co. 261 In
1973, the Sun Oil Company (Sun) had sold property including a
former mine to the McDonalds. 262 The mine had ceased operations in
1958, but the surface of the property contained a large pile (or piles)
of calcine tailings resulting from the mining; the tailings contained
mercury. 263 In 2001, a state regulatory agency told the McDonalds
that their handling of the calcine had created an environmental
release and ordered them to refrain from disturbing the calcine. 264 In
2003, the McDonalds sued Sun for negligence, contribution, breach
of contract and fraud. 265 The district court entered summary
judgment on the McDonalds' negligence claim, finding it barred by
Oregon's ten-year statute of repose for claims alleging negligent
injury to persons or property. 266
The court first looked to the plain meaning of Section 9658, noting
that the "'inquiry begins with the statutory text and ends there as well
if the text is unambiguous. "'267 Acknowledging the fixed-meaning
canon in its interpretation, the court stated "' [t]he proper inquiry
focuses on the ordinary meaning of the [provision] at the time
Congress enacted it. "'268 Thus, the court considered the meaning of
the term "statute of limitations" at the time that Congress enacted
Section 9658 in 1986, and found the term to be ambiguous regarding
whether it included statutes of repose. 269 The court stated, "[a]t that
time, although some cases recognized the differences between
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

548 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2008).
!d. at 777-78.
!d.
Jd. at 778.
Jd.

!d. at 779-80 (noting the district court entry of summary judgment based on OR. REv.
STAT.§ 12.115(1)).
267. Jd. at 780 (quoting BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004)).
268. Jd. (quoting BedRoc, 541 U.S. at 183). The Ninth Circuit criticized the Burlington
Northern court for failing to analyze the meaning of"statute oflimitations" at the time
Section 9658 was adopted. Id. at 782.
269. !d. at 781.
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statutes of limitation and repose, a number of cases confused the
terms or used them interchangeably"; therefore, "considerable
uncertainty about the distinction existed in 1986.'mo The court,
however, failed to consider the distinction between cases using the
term "repose" to describe a function of a statute of limitations and
those cases using the term "statute of repose" as a term of art
describing a limit that is triggered by the conduct of the defendant.
The court did not identify a single case using the term "statutes of
limitations" to describe the latter sense of "statute of repose" (i.e., in
the sense that a "statute of repose" is a "statute oflimitations"). 271
Having found the text of the statute ambiguous, the court analyzed
the legislative history of Section 9658 without considering whether
any substantive canon of construction would give rise to a
presumption regarding preemption. The court found that the Study
Group Report coupled with the House Report showed that Congress's
"primary concern" in enacting Section 9658 was to adopt a discovery
rule for circumstances in which "a plaintiff may lose a cause of action
before becoming aware of it."272 Because this predicament can occur
with either statutes of limitations or statutes of repose-"and is
probably most likely to occur where statutes of repose operate"-the
court concluded that the "only evidence of Congressional intent"
270. !d.; see also id. at 781 & n.3 (citing cases); id. at 781 & n.4 (citing legal scholarship).
Relying on case law to establish ambiguity may have been erroneous. The Supreme
Court stated that "[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by
reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used,
and the broader context of the statute as a whole." Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519
U.S. 337, 341 (1997). Even if that broader context includes judicial precedent, a court
must assume that Congress is aware of"relevantjudicial precedent," and does not rely
on isolated instances where courts make mistakes. See Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559
U.S. 633, 648 (2010).
271. McDonald, 548 F.3d at 781. All but one of the cases that the Ninth Circuit cited
concern statutes of limitations in which the court observed, as a descriptive matter,
that "statutes of limitation are statutes of repose." Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S.
209,230--31 (1953); accord United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979);
Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947); United States v. Or. Lumber Co.,
260 U.S. 290, 299 (1922); see Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603, 611
(7th Cir. 1975) ("It is this interest in finality which underlies the description of a
[statute of] limitations act as a 'statute of repose."'). In none of these cases does the
court consider "statute of repose" as a term of art applying to a period triggered by the
defendant's conduct. In the final case that the Ninth Circuit cited, Bolick v. American
Barmag Corp., the North Carolina Supreme Court actually recognized the distinction
between the two concepts four years before the enactment of Section 9658, citing the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 899, comment g, among other authorities.
Bolick v. Am. Barmag Corp., 293 S.E.2d 415, 417-18 (N.C. 1982); see supra text
accompanying note 192.
272. McDonald, 543 F.3d at 782-83.
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showed that the term "statute of limitations" meant to include
"statutes of repose. " 273
The court acknowledged that the Study Group Report differentiated
between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose in its
recommendation. 274
But, the court found this differentiation
insignificant because the House Report stated that Section 9658
"addresses the problem identified in the [Study Group Report],"
interpreting "the problem" to necessarily include plaintiffs losing
their cause of action by operation of statutes of repose. 275
The court's analysis of the legislative history gives too great weight
to this statement of the House Report and misinterprets the report's
use of the word "problem" as expressing congressional intent to
preserve any action in which a plaintiff could not have discovered an
injury before the action would be foreclosed by a state time bar. As
shown above, however, the only change to state law referenced in the
House Report was to "statutes of limitations."276 Given that the
House Report did not even mention statutes of repose, in context "the
problem" that Section 9658 meant to address was that some state
statutes of limitations began to run at the time of injury. This
problem is irrelevant to statutes of repose, which were meant to
address a different issue, namely that a discovery rule of accrual
created a potential for open-ended liability.
McDonald also fails to account for other evidence from the
legislative history, including: (1) that Section 9658 reflected a
compromise given that none of the recommendations of the Study
Group Report were enacted and proposals for private rights of action
were considered and rejected as part of the legislative process leading
up to SARA, and (2) that the provision of SARA adding Section
9658 to CERCLA was entitled "State Procedural Reform," showing
an intent to reform state procedures without impacting state
substantive rights (such as the substantive rights provided by statutes
of repose), which is consistent with CERCLA's savings clause.
In sum, the court's stretch to find ambiguity in the language of
Section 9658, its failure to acknowledge substantive canons of
construction, and its selective reading of the legislative history, show
that the court was not engaged in a holistic, objective interpretive
analysis in its decision.

273. !d. at 783.
274. !d.
275. !d.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 237-41.
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3. Waldburger: Considering Competing Textual Analyses,
Applications of Canons of Construction and Interpretations of
Legislative History
The next federal circuit court to address the issue, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 277 was sharply
divided on the issue. In 2009, landowners in Asheville, North
Carolina, discovered that their well water was contaminated with
trichloroethylene and dichloroethylene, and, in 2011, they sued the
CTS Corporation (CTS) claiming that the company had caused the
contamination. 278 The last alleged act or omission of CTS that could
have been responsible for the contamination occurred no later than
1987, when CTS sold its electronics manufacturing plant. 279 CTS
successfully moved to dismiss the case based on North Carolina's
applicable ten-year statute of repose. 280 On appeal, the court
determined that Section 9658 preempted the statute of repose, which
it recognized as distinct from a statute of limitations. 281
a.Finding Ambiguity in the Text, the Court Concludes There Is
Preemption Based on the Remedial Purpose Canon and
Legislative History.

Like the courts in Burlington Northern and McDonald, the Fourth
Circuit appropriately started its analysis by examining the text of the
statute; the court concluded that the text was ambiguous with respect
to whether statutes of repose were preempted. 282 Given that Section
9658 repeatedly used the words "statutes of limitations" and did not
reference "statutes of repose," the court noted that a "simple review"
of the language "could reasonably lead to a conclusion that its
application is limited only to statutes of limitations."283 The court,
however, considered an alternate reading of Section 9658 that could
support preemption of state statutes of repose: namely, that North
Carolina's statute of repose was "an 'applicable limitations period'
that is 'specified in the State statute of limitations or under common
277. Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W.
3130 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2014) (No. 13-339).
278. Id. at 437, 440--41.
279. /d. at 441.
280. /d. (stating the district court dismissal was based on N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 152(16)).
281. See id. at 441 (citing First United Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. U.S. Gypsum
Co., 882 F.2d 862, 866 (4th Cir. 1989) and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (9th ed.
2009)).
282. /d. at 442-43.
283. /d. at 442.
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law'" and provides "'a commencement date which is earlier than the
federally required commencement date. "'284 By stating that the
statute of repose was "an 'applicable limitations period,'" the court
slightly modified the actual language of the section which states "the
applicable limitations period."285 As stated previously, the use of
"the" in the statute implies that there is only one period subject to
preemption, namely, the period applicable to the statute of limitations
which is triggered by accrual. 286
The court made two additional observations to support ambiguity
"[l]est [the court] seem to be stretching to find ambiguity in the
text." 287 First, like the Ninth Circuit in McDonald, the court noted
that the terms "statute of limitations" and "statute of repose" had
often been used "interchangeably" making it "entirely probable" that
Congress meant to include North Carolina's statute of repose within
the preemptive scope of Section 9658. 288 As in McDonald, however,
the court failed to consider precisely how the terms had been used
historically; it failed to recognize that the phrase "statute of repose"
had historically described a function of statutes of limitations,
whereas for the past several decades the legal term of art "statute of
repose" had referenced a particular type of statute that operated
differently from a statute of limitations. Second, the court found that
the statute manifested "a lack of internal consistency" by referencing
periods specified in the common law in some places but not in
others/ 89 but the court failed to explain how that makes the statute
ambiguous with respect to whether it preempts statutes of repose.
The reference to "common law" in Section 9658 was likely designed
to incorporate any common law principle that might affect the

Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(l) (2006)).
Compare id., with 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1) (emphasis added). The court repeated this
modification in the subsequent paragraph when it stated that North Carolina's ten year
statute located within the section titled "Limitations, Other than Real Property," was
"[a]s such ... a limitations period 'specified in the State statute oflimitations or under
common law."' Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 442 (emphasis added).
286. See supra text accompanying notes 194-95and note 195. While the word "the" here
clearly refers to the singular, the word "a" or "an" more readily implies a plural
meaning. See 2A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 83, § 47.34, at 497 ("It is most often
ruled that a term introduced by 'a' or 'an' applies to multiple subjects or objects
unless there is reason to fmd that singular application was intended or is reasonably
understood.") (footnote omitted).
287. Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 443.
288. Id. (citing McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 781 & nn. 3-4 (9th Cir. 2008)).
289. Id.
284.
285.
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commencement date of the limitations period, such as incorporation
of a discovery rule through judicial interpretation. 290
Finding that the statutory language was ambiguous, the court
turned to other indications of legislative intent. 291 With respect to
substantive canons of construction, the court repeatedly referenced
the remedial purpose canon to support a "broad interpretation" or
"liberal construction" of CERCLA as a remedial statute. 292 The court
noted that CERCLA was the "most remedial of all environmental
statutes" designed to clean up "expeditiously abandoned hazardous
waste sites and respond to hazardous spills and releases of toxic
wastes into the environment."293 The court, however, did not make a
compelling case that any particular remedial purpose of CERCLA
was related to the preemption of state statutes of repose. The court
specifically identified two remedial purposes of CERCLA: "to (1)
'establish a comprehensive response and financing mechanism to
abate and control the vast problems associated with abandoned and
inactive hazardous waste disposal sites' and (2) 'shift the costs of
cleanup to the parties responsible for the contamination. "'294
Nowhere in its decision does the court tie preemption of state statutes
of repose to either of these purposes; instead, the court articulated a
broad congressional purpose for Section 9658, namely, "removing
barriers to relief from toxic wreckage," and justified its interpretation
on that basis. 295 The court also failed to consider explicitly whether
Section 9658 reflected a "legislatively crafted compromise;" in such
290.

291.
292.

293.
294.
295.

The reference to "common law" appears in Section 9658(a)(l) regarding determining
the "commencement date" for statutes of limitations. The Study Group Report
included in its Appendix a survey of how statutes of limitations for personal injury
operated in every state. The survey found that some states had a discovery rule of
accrual within the text of the statute 'Of limitations while other states incorporated a
discovery rule through judicial interpretation (i.e., common law). SUPERFUND
SECTION 30l(E) STUDY GRP., 97TH CONG., INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS
WASTES-ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES, S. Doc. NO. 97-571, at
app.l3-17 (Comm. Print 1982). Under the "surplusage" canon the phrase "common
law" must have some meaning beyond statute of limitations and this is the most
plausible interpretation.
Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 443.
/d. at 443-44 (citing Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 180 (1949); Niagara Mohawk
Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 132 (2d Cir. 2010); Axel
Johnson, Inc. v. Carroll Carolina Oil Co., 191 F.3d 409, 416 (4th Cir. 1999); First
United Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 867 (4th
Cir. 1989)).
/d. at 443 (quoting Watson, supra note 83, at 286).
/d. at 438 (quoting Metro Water Reclamation Dist. v. N. Am. Galvanizing &
Coatings, Inc., 473 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2007)).
/d. at 444.
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circumstances, it would be inappropriate to use the remedial purpose
canon to justify a broad construction of Section 9658 to preempt state
statutes of repose. 296
The court also failed to even reference the presumption against
preemption canon, let alone consider whether application of that
canon was more apt than the remedial purpose canon based on an
objective evaluation of both canons in the particular legislative
context.
While failing to reference the presumption against
preemption canon, the court stated that it was not ignoring wellknown policies underlying statutes of repose. 297 But, the court did
not fully and accurately identify the underlying reason for statutes of
repose. Significantly, the court did not acknowledge that statutes of
repose are designed to curtail the long-tail liability created by a
discovery rule of accrual; instead, it merely stated that "[r]epose
statutes do not exist simply to protect defendants." 298 The court then
quoted United States v. Kubrick out of context to support its claim
that statutes of repose "ensure that cases are processed efficiently."299
Kubrick actually identified this as a purpose of a statute of
limitations, not of a statute of repose. 300 Having incorrectly identified
"efficient case processing" as a purpose of statutes of repose, the
court noted that in finding preemption, it had not relaxed a plaintiffs
burden of proof. 301 The court stated that the passage of time in latent
harm cases would still make it more difficult for a plaintiff to
establish a case. 302 Finally, the court remarked that its decision had
not altered North Carolina's statute of limitations, so that plaintiffs
would still be required to "bring claims within three years of

296. The court only noted (in a parenthetical to a case citation) that CERCLA itself was the
product of an "eleventh hour compromise." See id. at 438 (quoting New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1039-40 (2d Cir. 1985)). The court did not
discuss the legislative proposals leading to SARA six years later.
297. !d. at 444.
298. !d.
299. !d. (citing United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. Ill, 117 (1979)).
300. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117. The inappropriate citation of Kubrick was based on the
Kubrick Court's descriptive statement that statutes of limitations "are statutes of
repose," followed with an enumeration of the purposes of statutes of limitations. !d.
The Waldburger court simply began its parenthetical quote of Kubrick with the words
"statutes of repose." Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 444. The misimpression results from
confusing the phrase "statute of repose" used in a descriptive sense with the phrase
"statute of repose" as a legal term of art. See supra text accompanying notes 51-58.
301. 723 F.3d at 444.
302. Id. at 444-45.
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discovery," and defendants "will not necessarily be endlessly
subjected to the possibility oflitigation."303
The court's characterization of state policies is a good illustration
of the perils of failing to adhere to the principle of Chesterton's fence
by fully understanding the purposes of what is being stricken. Had
the court looked more deeply into the purposes of statutes of repose,
it would have appreciated that statutes of repose were a response to
the discovery rule of accrual and were designed to give some
predictability to a defendant's potential liability. Faithful application
of the presumption against preemption canon would have assisted the
court in giving appropriate deference to substantive state law in an
area of traditional state authority; by failing to give appropriate
deference, it risked substituting its own policy judgment for that of
the state legislature. 304
While discussing the legislative history in more detail than the
McDonald court had, the Fourth Circuit, like the McDonald court,
selectively read the legislative history and assumed that the House
Report's statement that Section 9658 was meant to "address[] the
problem" identified in the Study Group Report showed that Congress
intended to preempt both statutes of limitations and statutes of
repose. 305 In fact, the court went a step further and identified statutes
of repose as "precisely the barrier that Congress intended § 9658 to
address," so that any reading of the statute to make it inapplicable to
statutes of repose, "cannot be termed an honest attempt to 'effectuate
Congress's intent. "'306 Like the McDonald court, the Fourth Circuit
did not discuss other indications of intent in the legislative history. It
is particularly significant that the court cited the Study Group's
statement that it was proposing "to remove unreasonable procedural
and other barriers to recovery, " 307 but failed to note that the provision
of SARA that added Section 9658 to CERCLA was entitled "State
Procedural Reform." Given that statutes of repose create substantive
rights, it is telling that the court did not address the potential
relevance of the title that Congress gave to Section 9658 in SARA.

303. /d. at 445.
304. The court's characterization of the substantive right as the right to be "free from the
threat of being called to account for ... contaminating acts," reflects the low value
that the court placed on the North Carolina state legislature's substantive enactment.
/d. at 444.
305. /d. at 439.
306. !d. at 444.
307. /d. at 439 (citing SUPERFUND SECTION 30l(E) STUDY GRP., 97TH CONG., INJURIES AND
DAMAGES FROM HAzARDOUS WASTEs-ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL
REMEDIES, S. Doc. No. 97-571, at 240 (Comm. Print 1982)).
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The title reveals that procedural state statutes of limitations without a
discovery rule were "precisely the barrier" that Congress intended to
address, not substantive state statutes of repose.
b.Disagreeing that the Text Is Ambiguous and Considering
Additional Indications of Congressional Intent in the
Presumption against Preemption Canon and the Legislative
History, the Dissent Concludes There Is No Preemption.

The dissent provided a more holistic and balanced interpretation.
The dissent concluded that the language of the statute was not
ambiguous: "statutes of limitations" did not include "statutes of
repose," even considering the meaning of those terms at the time of
the enactment of Section 9658 in 1986.308 The dissent recognized
that it could have stopped the analysis at that point. 309 The dissent,
however, also considered canons of construction and the legislative
history of Section 9658 to support its interpretation. 310 The dissent
found that the presumption against preemption canon applied with
particular force in fields that states traditionally regulate, which
would include creating "a substantive right to be free from liability
under its own state tort law." 311 The dissent did not ignore the
remedial purpose canon, but found that "the plain meaning of the
statute and the role of legislative compromise restrain[ed] the
application" of the canon. 312 Finally, in reviewing the legislative
history of Section 9658, the dissent pointed out that the Study Group
308. !d. at 448 (Thacker, J., dissenting) (relying on the definition of "statute of limitations"
in the 1979 edition of Black's Law Dictionary, which stated descriptively that
"statutes of limitations are statutes of repose," but did not state or imply that a statute
of repose is a statute of limitations). The dissent also stated that Section 9658 could
not preempt North Carolina's statute of repose because that statute of repose did not
provide a "commencement date," or "beginning of the period in which a civil action
may be brought," against which to measure the "federally required commencement
date." /d. at 450. For a statute of repose like the North Carolina statute at issue, one
could consider a "commencement date" to be the "last act or omission" of the
defendant, but that date does not begin a "period in which a civil action may be
brought." The plaintiff must be injured before there can be a cause of action. Rather,
the trigger date for a statute of repose begins the period that sets the "outer limit, after
which no cause of action may accrue." /d.
309. /d. at 446; see also id. at 450 ("Given the plain meaning of the statute, we need not
look to legislative history.").
310. /d. at 450--53.
311. /d. at 453 (citing Nat'l City Bank of Ind. v. Turnbaugh, 463 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir.
2006)).
312. /d. at 452 (citing 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank of Cal., 915 F.2d
1355, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990); Watson, supra note 83, at 300--01).
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Report showed that Congress was aware of the distinction between
statutes of limitations and statutes of repose, and could have
explicitly covered both of them if that was Congress's intent. 313
Instead, Congress adopted an "enhanced discovery rule" which the
Study Group Report had recommended should apply to statutes of
limitations. 314 Finally, the dissent recognized that the Study Group
Report had recommended a number of other changes to state law, but
"the only revision affecting state law Congress chose to implement in
the section explicitly covering state procedural reform was the
enhanced discovery rule via the federally required commencement
date." 315
The analysis of the dissent in Waldburger most closely tracks the
interpretive approach recommended here. As the dissent recognized,
it could have ended its analysis with the text. 316 But, given that the
majority had reached a different conclusion regarding the text (giving
some credence to a finding of ambiguity), it was prudent to consider
other indications of congressional intent. The dissent started with
legislative history, whereas the interpretive approach recommends
considering substantive canons of construction first to determine
whether there should be any presumption regarding preemption
before weighing extra-textual evidence. In any event, the dissent
considered all potentially applicable canons of construction and most
pieces of evidence from the legislative history; in doing so, it
provided good reasoning for its opinion without straying into judicial
policy-making.
The conclusion that follows from the interpretive analysis is that
Section 9658 of CERCLA does not preempt state statutes of repose.
Section 9658 does not express a clear intent to preempt statutes of
repose. Without a clear expression of preemptive intent in the text,
there must be strong extra-textual evidence that Congress intended to
preempt state statutes of repose given that the most applicable
interpretive presumption disfavors preemption. The extra-textual
evidence does not support preemption of statutes of repose, but, if
anything, shows that Congress confined itself to enacting a uniform
rule of accrual for statutes of limitations for lawsuits subject to the
section.

313. !d. at 451-52.
314. /d. at 451.
315. /d. at 452-53 (citing Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-499, § 203, 100 Stat. 1613, 1695-96 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
9658 (2006))).
316. Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 450 (Thacker, J., dissenting).
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VI. APPLYING THE INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK TO
EXISTING CONFLICTS IN FEDERAL LAW: THE FTCA
A.

Considering Whether the FTCA Preempts State Statutes of
Repose -Statutory Background

Another federal statute that some courts have found to preempt
state statutes of repose is the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),317
which waives the sovereign immunity of the United States for certain
torts committed by federal employees while acting within the scope
of their employment. 318 There are several conditions on the FTCA's
waiver of sovereign immunity. One of these conditions is the
analogous private liability requirement, which holds that if a private
person in similar circumstances would not be liable to the plaintiff for
the alleged conduct then a court does not have jurisdiction over the
FTCA claim against the United States. 319
The requirement rests on two separate provisions of the FTCA.
First, the FTCA's jurisdictional grant states that a court may exercise
jurisdiction over the United States, "under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred."320 Second, the FTCA provides that the "United States
shall be liable . . . in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances." 321
Under these
provisions, courts apply substantive state tort law to FTCA claims
against the United States. 322 In circumstances where state law would
provide substantive protection from tort liability to an analogous
private party in like circumstances, the United States is immune to
317.

318.
319.

320.
321.
322.

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006); e.g., Cooper v. United States, No. 12-7244, 2013 WL
6845988, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2013); Jones v. United States, 789 F. Supp. 2d 883,
885 (M.D. Tenn. 2011); Zander v. United States, 786 F. Supp. 2d 880, 886 (D. Md.
2011).
§ 1346(b)(1).
See, e.g., United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 44 (2005) ("[T]he United States waives
sovereign immunity 'under circumstances' where local law would make a 'private
person' liable in tort."); Liranzo v. United States, 690 F.3d 78, 97 (2d Cir. 2012)
("Even for alleged torts occurring in quintessentially federal contexts, the question
remains whether analogous private liability exists under state law."); In re FEMA
Trailer Formaldehyde Prod. Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d 281, 287-90 (5th Cir. 2012)
(finding no waiver of sovereign immunity under the FICA where an analogous
private party would be immune from suit under state emergency statutes).
28 u.s.c. § 1346(b)(1).
!d. § 2674.
See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471,477-78 (1994).
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suit under the FTCA. 323 As a result of the private analogous liability
requirement, some courts have held that the United States cannot be
sued under the FTCA if an action against an analogous private party
under like circumstances would be barred by a state statute of
repose. 324
Some courts, however, have refused to apply the time bar of a state
statute of repose to claims against the United States. These courts
have found that the FTCA's statute of limitations preempts state
statutes of repose. 325 The FTCA has a statute of limitations which
provides that:
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred
unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal
agency within two years after such claim accrues or unless
action is begun within six months after the date of the
mailing . . . of notice of final denial of the claim by the
agency to which it was presented. 326

See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 653 F.2d 196, 201 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[L]iability of
the United States under the Act arises only when the law of the state would impose
it."). An early article on the FTCA noted that "[p]robably no part of the Act will give
rise to more perplexing problems" because the language of the Act "inevitably leads
to a re-examination of the frequently considered distinction between matters of
substance and matters of procedure." Federal Tort Claims Act: Useful Discussion at
Fourth Circuit Conference, 33 A.B.A. J. 857, 860 (1947) (footnote omitted).
324. See, e.g., Simmons (Ex rei. Estate of Elliott) v. United States, 421 F.3d ll99, 1199
(lith Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (dismissing an FTCA claim for medical malpractice
based on applicable Georgia statute of repose); West v. United States, No. 08-646GPM, 2010 WL 4781146, at *4-5 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2010) (fmding that an FTCA
action was barred by the Illinois statute of repose for medical malpractice claims);
Brown v. United States, 514 F. Supp. 2d 146, 155, 157-58 (D. Mass. 2007) (finding
an FTCA claim barred by a Massachusetts statute of repose for actions involving
improvements to real property), ajf'd, 557 F.3d l (lst Cir. 2009); Vega v. United
States, 512 F. Supp. 2d 853, 860 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (dismissing an FTCA negligent
design claim based on applicable Texas statute of repose); Manion v. United States,
No. CV-06-739-HU, 2006 WL 2990381, at *4, *9 (D. Or. Oct. 18, 2006) (fmding an
FTCA claim barred by an Oregon statute of repose for negligence claims); Simmons
(Ex rei Estate of Elliott) v. United States, 225 F.R.D. 688, 694, 696 (N.D. Ga. 2004)
(finding an FTCA action barred by a Georgia statute of repose for medical
malpractice actions), affd, 421 F.3d 1199 (II th Cir. 2005).
325. See, e.g., Mamea v. United States, No. 08-00563 LEK-RLP, 2011 WL 4371712, at
*12-13 (D. Haw. Sept. 16, 2011); Abila v. United States, No. 2:09-CV-01345-KJDLRL, 2011 WL 3444166, at *2-3 (D. Nev. Aug. 8, 20ll); Jones v. United States, 789
F. Supp. 2d 883, 892 (M.D. Tenn. 2011); Zander v. United States, 786 F. Supp. 2d
880, 886 (D. Md. 2011).
326. 28 u.s.c. § 240l(b).
323.
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Despite being written in the disjunctive, a plaintiff must comply
with each of two separate time requirements to file an action in
federal court: (1) a plaintiff must present a tort claim to a federal
agency within two years of the date the claim "accrues," and (2) a
plaintiff must file a lawsuit within six months after the date that the
agency sends a denial of the claim to the plaintiff. 327 With respect to
the second period, if an agency fails to take action within six months
after a claim is filed, "any time thereafter" the claimant may deem the
claim denied and file suit in federal court. 328
Courts have applied a "discovery rule" of accrual in certain
circumstances to trigger the two-year limitations period for filing a
claim with a federal agency. The discovery rule of accrual for FTCA
claims had its genesis in United States v. Kubrick, 329 a malpractice
case in which the Supreme Court found that accrual of the FTCA' s
statute of limitations did not require knowledge that an injury was
negligently inflicted. 330 While the Kubrick Court did not directly hold
that a discovery rule of accrual applied to the FTCA's two-year
statute of limitations, 331 language in the decision strongly implied that
the Court would recognize a discovery rule for FTCA medical
malpractice claims. 332 Under the rule, the two-year limitations period
begins to run when a claimant discovers, or should have discovered,
"critical facts" regarding injury and causation that would lead the
claimant to seek advice in the medical and legal community. 333 Since
Kubrick, lower courts have accepted, without question, the
proposition that the FTCA's two-year statute of limitations has a
327. See, e.g., Ellison v. United States, 531 F.3d 359, 361-62 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining
pursuant to principles of statutory interpretation that the FTCA requires both
deadlines to be met and any other reading "would effectively eliminate any court
deadline" for initiating an FTCA suit); Dyniewicz v. United States, 742 F.2d 484, 485
(9th Cir. 1984) ("Section 2401(b) establishes two jurisdictional hurdles, both of which
must be met."); Schuler v. United States, 628 F.2d 199, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
("[Section 2401(b)] requires the claimant both to file the claim with the agency within
two years after accrual of the claim and then to file a complaint in the District Court
within six months after the agency denies the claim.").
328. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
329. 444 u.s. 111,118-25 (1979).
330. !d. at 122-24.
331. See Bain & Colella, supra note 34, at 556--57 (showing that the Supreme Court did
not hold that a discovery rule applied to FTCA claims).
332. See Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122 ("The prospect is not so bleak for a plaintiff in
possession of the critical facts that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury.
He is no longer at the mercy of the latter. There are others who can tell him if he has
been wronged, and he need only ask.").
333. See id. at 122-23.
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discovery rule of accrual. 334 Some courts have stated that this
discovery rule is limited to exceptional cases, such as medical
malpractice and latent disease cases, in which a plaintiff could not
have immediately discovered an injury; other courts, however, have
applied the discovery rule more broadly to other FTCA actions. 335
Applying a discovery rule of accrual to FTCA actions can greatly
extend the time during which the United States may be liable for its
negligent conduct. As long as a plaintiff does not know or have
reason to know of an injury and its potential cause, the two-year
statute of limitations does not begin. Unlike many state statutes that
provide a statute of repose as an outer limit on the time when a
plaintiff can bring a cause of action, the FTCA has no such statutory
time barrier.
There are plausible reasons why there is no statute of repose in the
FTCA. At the time of the FICA's passage, a discovery rule of
accrual was not generally recognized in the common law in the
absence of fraudulent concealment, so there would have been no
reason for Congress to conside,r an outer time limit on claims as
measured from the defendant's conduct. 336 In fact, there is good
reason to believe that Congress did not think that a discovery rule
applied to accrual of the FICA's statute of limitations when the
FTCA was enacted, given that the FTCA' s statute of limitations was
extended from one year to two years in 1949 to cover situations in
which a plaintiff could not discover the injury within a year. 337
Without a discovery rule of accrual there is no need for a statute of
repose. 338
Additionally, because a general discovery rule of accrual had not
been included within state statutes of limitations or recognized in
334. Bain & Colella, supra note 34, at 559.
335. /d. at 561 (citing cases).
336. A general discovery rule of accrual in the absence of fraud or concealment was not
incorporated into a federal statute of limitations until 1949 in Urie v. Thompson, 337
U.S. 163 (1949). See supra text accompanying notes 33-36; see also Bain & Colella,
supra note 34, at 553-56.
337. A House Report on the 1949 amendment stated that the one-year period was unfair to
claimants who "suffered injuries which did not fully develop until after the expiration
of the period for making claim," and to those who may not get notice of the potential
wrongful death of a next-of-kin until after a suit was already time barred. See H.R.
REP. No. 81-276, at 3-4 (1949). The Kubrick Court stated that this passage "seems
almost to indicate that the time of accrual is the time of injury." 444 U.S. at 119 n.6.
Had a discovery rule of accrual been recognized at the time, this amendment would
have been unnecessary for the reasons given in the House Report. See Bain &
Colella, supra note 34, at 557-58.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 40-49.
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state common law by 1946, statutes of repose-which were a
reaction to a discovery rule of accrual for statutes of limitations-had
not been enacted. Thus, Congress had no precedent for including a
statute of repose in the FTCA. 339 Finally, as described above, to the
extent statutes of repose are part of the substantive law of the state,
they are already incorporated into the FTCA through the analogous
private liability requirement. Though Congress could not have
known at the time it enacted the FTCA that the state substantive law
would someday include statutes of repose, it is not unusual for a
state's substantive law to change, and the FTCA's incorporation of
substantive state law to determine the scope of the United States'
liability is not static.
B.

Considering Whether the FTCA Preempts State Statutes of
Repose -Interpretive Analysis
!.Considering the Text

With that background, one can consider the question of whether the
FTCA preempts state statutes of repose under the interpretive
framework. Initially, the FTCA does not contain an express
preemption provision. As a waiver of sovereign immunity statute, it
created a right that did not exist previously: namely, the right to bring
a tort suit against the United States under certain conditions. The
conditions that the FTCA established for the waiver of sovereign
immunity include both procedural and substantive limitations. For
example, as a matter of procedure, plaintiffs must first exhaust
administrative remedies and comply with certain time limits in
pursuing a claim?40 Substantively, the United States cannot be held
liable for certain types of torts, such as those based in discretionary
policy or founded on strict liability. 341 Nothing in the statute
339.

340.
341.

As a point of comparison, the FTCA's present administrative claims requirement was
modeled after state statutes with similar requirements for bringing suits against
municipalities. See S. REP. No. 89-1327, at 3-4 (1966), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N.
2515, 2517; see also Avery v. United States, 680 F.2d 608, 610-11 (9th Cir. 1982)
(citing legislative history).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2006) (statutes of limitations); id. § 2675 (administrative
exhaustion requirement).
The "discretionary function exception," which shields policy-based conduct from tort
suit, is found in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). See also United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S.
315, 322-23 (1991). Additionally, because the United States has only waived its
sovereign immunity for tort claims based on "negligent or wrongful" acts or
omissions, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), there is no waiver for strict liability claims. See
Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802-03 (1972).
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displaces state substantive law. To the contrary, state substantive law
is expressly incorporated into the statute through the analogous
private liability requirement. 342
2.Reconciling Competing Substantive Canons of Construction
The next step in the interpretive analysis is to determine whether
substantive canons of construction give rise to any presumption
regarding meaning. Because the FTCA expressly incorporates
substantive state law, there should be a strong presumption against
preemption of any substantive state law that is consistent with the
FTCA's operation. There are, however, two other potentially
relevant substantive canons of construction: the remedial purpose
canon and the presumption against waivers of sovereign immunity
canon. The FTCA is a remedial statute in the sense that it provides a
remedy to those injured by the government's wrongful conduct. 343 It
is also a waiver of sovereign immunity statute, and one of the express
conditions of the waiver is the private analogous liability requirement
that incorporates substantive state law, such as statutes ofrepose. 344
The Supreme Court has never explicitly endorsed the remedial
purpose canon or the presumption against waivers of sovereign
immunity canon as the preeminent canon for construing the FTCA.
To the contrary, Supreme Court statements would lead to the
conclusion that neither of these substantive canons will establish any
presumption in interpreting the statute. In Smith v. United States345
the Court acknowledged that its decisions contained "varying

342. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(l), 2671.
343. Courts have applied the remedial purpose canon to interpretation of the FTCA. See,
e.g., Terbush v. United States, 516 F.3d 1125, 1135 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that FTCA
was a remedial statute, and "it should be construed liberally, and its exceptions should
be read narrowly") (internal quotation marks omitted); O'Toole v. United States, 295
F.3d 1029, 1037 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The FTCA, as a remedial statute, should be
construed liberally, and its exceptions should be read narrowly."); Kielwien v. United
States, 540 F.2d 676, 681 (4th Cir. 1976) ("The [FTCA] is remedial and should be
liberally construed to grant the relief contemplated by Congress.").
344. Courts have applied the presumption against waivers of sovereign immunity canon to
interpretation of the FTCA See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453
F.3d 1331, 1335 (lith Cir. 2006) (interpreting the FTCA's statute of limitations and
stating that the "terms upon which the Government consents to be sued must be
strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied") (internal quotation
marks omitted); Roma v. United States, 344 F.3d 352, 362 (3d Cir. 2003) (interpreting
the FTCA's administrative presentment requirement based on a "strict construction of
the limited waiver of sovereign immunity").
345. 507 U.S. 197 (1993).
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statements" regarding how the FTCA "should be construed,"346 but,
at bottom, concluded that it would neither extend nor narrow the
waiver of immunity beyond what Congress intended. 347 More
recently, in Dolan v. United States Postal Service, 348 the Court
emphasized with respect to exceptions to the waiver of immunity in
the FTCA that its job was to "identify those circumstances which are
within the words and reason of the exception-no less and no
more."349 These statements have led one court to conclude that the
remedial purpose canon and presumption against waivers of
sovereign immunity canon "cancel out" one another and are thus "of
little assistance in interpreting the FTCA. " 350 Thus, a court should not
rely on either of these canons in isolation to make a presumption
regarding congressional intent to preempt state law. At the same
time, the Supreme Court has not considered the preemptive reach of
the FTCA, so it has not had occasion to apply the presumption
against preemption canon to the Act. Given the FTCA's express
incorporation of state substantive law, however, one would expect the
Court to require strong evidence of congressional intent to support a
conclusion that the FTCA preempts state statutes of repose.
3.Determining Whether There Is Sufficient Evidence of
Congressional Intent to Rebut the Presumption against
Preemption
Courts fmding that the FTCA preempted state statutes of repose
have applied the doctrines of field preemption or conflict preemption
to determine congressional preemptive intent. In Mamea v. United
States, 351 a court applied the doctrine of field preemption to find that
the FTCA preempted state statutes of repose. In that case, plaintiffs
alleged that physicians at an Army medical center failed properly to
diagnose and treat plaintiff Suilia Mamea in 1997 and 1998 thereby
causing severe injuries, including end stage renal disease. 352 The
United States argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
346. /d. at 203 (citing Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 853 n.9 (1984); United States
v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813 (1976); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 31
(1953); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 547 (1951)).
347. 507 U.S. at 203 (citing United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979)).
348. 546 u.s. 481 (2006).
349. !d. at 492 (quoting Kosak, 465 U.S. at 853 n.9 (1984) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
350. Devlin v. United States, 352 F.3d 525, 534 n.10 (2d Cir. 2003).
351. No. 08-00563 LEK-RLP, 2011 WL 4371712 (D. Haw. Sept. 16, 2011).
352. !d. at *1.
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because the plaintiffs failed to file their action before the expiration
of Hawaii's six-year statute of repose for medical torts. 353
The district court found that the FTCA preempted the Hawaii
statute of repose, concluding that "Congress'[s] decision to define the
FTCA's statute of limitations in terms of accrual [was] a clear
indication that it intended to occupy the field of both statutes of
limitations and statutes of repose, which would bar claims without
regard to accrual."354 But, the court's application of the field
preemption doctrine is flawed. Even if the doctrine could properly
apply to fields as narrow as "limitations periods applicable to tort
actions against federal employees acting within the scope of their
employment" (which is questionable), 355 Congress's "decision to
define the FTCA's statute of limitations in terms of accrual," cannot
be evidence that it intended to occupy that field. As discussed above,
when Congress enacted the FTCA in 1946 there was no general
discovery rule of accrual for statutes of limitations and therefore no
place for application of statutes of repose. 356 Thus, when the Mamea
court states, "[i]nsofar as Congress expressly defined the statute of
limitations for the FTCA in terms of accrual, applying state statutes
of repose can effectively shorten the limitations period,"357 it was
making an assumption about accrual that did not exist when Congress
enacted the FTCA. Only if accrual could be delayed by a discovery
rule could a statute of repose affect the right to bring an action that
would otherwise be timely under the FTCA's statute of limitations.
Because this circumstance arose after Congress enacted the FTCA in
1946-through incorporation of a discovery rule into the FTCA and
passage of statutes of repose by state legislatures-it cannot be
evidence of congressional intent to occupy the field of statutes of
repose.
Contrary to the Mamea court's conclusion regarding field
preemption, the FTCA shows congressional intent through the
analogous private liability requirement to incorporate the field of
353. !d. at *2 (citing HAw. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 657-7.3).
354. !d. at *I 0.
355. While the field deemed preempted through field preemption can be narrowly defined,
it must at least be broad enough to be considered a "field." See, e.g., Arizona v.
United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502-03 (2012) (applying field preemption to the field
of alien registration); Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393,
409 (2d Cir. 2013) (stating that radiological safety represents an "arena of field
preemption"); Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F .3d 363, 367 (3d Cir. 1999)
(applying field preemption to standards of care for air safety).
356. See supra text accompanying notes 336-39.
357. Mamea v. United States, No. 08-00563 LEK-RLP, 2011 WL 4371712, at *10 (D.
Haw. Sept. 16, 2011).
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state substantive law into the Act to determine the substantive
parameters of the United States' tort liability. Congress must have
recognized at the time of the FTCA's enactment that the private
liability of private parties in the various states would change over
time by virtue of state legislation and changes in state common law.
Changes in state substantive law could therefore change the extent to
which the United States could be liable under the FTCA. 358
Courts have made a better case for FTCA preemption of state
statutes of repose by applying the principles of conflict preemption.
The apparent conflict arises in comparing the operation of the
FTCA's two separate statutes of limitations with the typical state
statute of repose. By requiring administrative exhaustion through the
filing of an administrative claim before a plaintiff may bring a federal
lawsuit, the statutes of limitations in the FTCA, are, by their nature,
different than the typical state requirements to file a court action that
is timely under both the state statute of limitations and the statute of
repose.

358. The Mamea court downplayed the distinction between procedural statutes of
limitations and substantive statutes of repose. Id. at *13. Citing a 1945 Supreme
Court case that did not involve the FTCA, the court stated that state court distinctions
between procedural statutes of limitations and substantive statutes of repose are
"immaterial;" according to the court, because a statute of limitations can completely
bar recovery, it can be considered substantive law. /d. (citing Guar. Trust Co. of
N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)). This ignores the consistent distinction that courts
have drawn between the nature of statutes of limitations and statutes of repose, see
supra text accompanying notes 25-38, as well as the distinction the FTCA makes
between the procedural time limits for first submitting an administrative claim and
then filing a lawsuit, and the state substantive law that the FTCA incorporates through
the analogous private liability requirement. The court also inappropriately relied on a
Ninth Circuit case finding that the FTCA statute of limitations preempted a state
statute of limitations by taking out of context the Ninth Circuit's statement that the
FTCA preempted the "state period of limitations." 2011 WL 4371712, at *12 (citing
Poindexter v. United States, 647 F.2d 34, 36 (9th Cir. 1981)). Similar to the Fourth
Circuit's mischaracterization of Section 9658 in Waldburger, see supra Part V.B.3.a,
the court in Mamea read the Ninth Circuit to state that the FTCA preempted "any
'state period of limitations'," when the Ninth Circuit actually stated it preempted "the
state period of limitations." Compare Mamea, 2011 WL 4371712, at *12, with
Poindexter, 647 F.2d at 36 (emphases added). The state period of limitations most
clearly references the period in a statute of limitations. In that same case, the Ninth
Circuit recognized that substantive provisions of state law, even when included in a
provision containing a state statute of limitations, must be given effect in an FTCA
action. Poindexter, 647 F.2d at 36-37; see also Abila v. United States, No. 2:09: CV013450-KJD-LRL, 2011 WL 3444166, at *4 (D. Nev. Aug. 8, 2011) (characterizing
the Ninth Circuit's Poindexter decision).
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This is illustrated in Zander v. United States/ 59 in which the court
considered the operation of the FTCA' s two statutes of limitations
and found a conflict with application of a state statute of repose. In
Zander, the plaintiff claimed medical malpractice over several years
through 2002 and filed FTCA administrative claims in November
2004, "within two years" of the plaintiffs injury and the alleged
negligence. 360 Several years later, on April 8, 2009, the government
denied the plaintiffs administrative claims, and the plaintiff filed her
complaint against the United States less than six months later as
required by the FTCA's six-month statute of limitations. 361 Thus, the
plaintiff satisfied both of the FTCA's statutes of limitations. The
United States, however, argued that the plaintiffs action was
untimely under the Maryland statute of repose because she failed to
file her malpractice suit in court within five years "'of the time the
injury was committed. "'362
In its preemption analysis, the court found that characterization of
the Maryland statute of repose as substantive was "immaterial" if
"'there is a direct conflict between the federal and the state law. "'363
The court determined that such a conflict existed because under the
FTCA's "deemed denied" provision if the plaintiff did not receive a
response to the administrative claim within six months of filing the
claim with the appropriate administrative agency, the plaintiff could
file an action "any time thereafter."364 Consequently, the FTCA
allowed Zander to file her claim "any time" between the date six
months following the submission of the administrative claims (late
May 2005) and the date six months following the date that the agency
sent the notice of denial (October 8, 2009). 365 Thus, the Zander court
reasoned, because the statute of repose would cut off any action not
brought by November 30, 2007 (the date five years after the injury),
there was a "clear conflict."366 Other courts have found conflict
preemption on the same basis. 367
359. 786 F. Supp. 2d 880 (D. Md. 2011).
360. !d. at 882.
361. !d. at 882-83.
362. !d. at 883 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & Jun. PROC. § 5-l09(a)(l)). The Court of
Appeals of Maryland later determined that this provision was a statute of limitations
and not a statute of repose. See Anderson v. United States, 427 Md. 99, 105-10, 46
A.3d 426, 430-43 (2012).
363. 786 F. Supp. 2d at 885 (quoting Stonehedge/Fasa-Tex. JDC v. Miller, No. 96-10037,
1997 WL 119899, at *2 (5th Cir. Mar. 10, 1997)).
364. /d. at 884-86 (citing 28 U.S. C.§ 2675).
365. See id. at 886.
366. /d.; see also Mamea v. United States, No. 08-00563 LEK-RLP, 2011 WL 4371712, at
*10 (D. Haw. Sept. 16, 2011) ("Applying state statutes of repose, which do not take
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Rather than fmding that state statutes of repose are preempted, a
better view is that a plaintiff perfects a tort claim against the United
States for purpose of the applicable statute of repose through the
filing of the administrative claim. Under this view, the date of filing
of the administrative claim is that the date that controls the
determination of whether an analogous private person would be liable
under the state statute of repose. This construction finds support in
the interpretation of the FTCA's analogous private liability
requirement and in the presumption against preemption canon.
Under the FTCA's private analogous liability requirement, courts
do not define the United States' substantive liability by reference to
"identical circumstances" of private party liability under state law but
rather to "like circumstances."368 The Supreme Court has stated that
the words "like circumstances" do not "restrict a court's inquiry to
the same circumstances, but require it to look further afield." 369 With
respect to application of state statutes of repose, the filing an
administrative claim with a federal agency under the FTCA is
analogous to the filing of a lawsuit against a private party in state
court. Both actions put the alleged tortfeasor on notice of the claim
and provide an opportunity to respond. But, as seen in cases like
Zander, because of the delay inherent in the administrative
exhaustion requirement, compelling an FTCA plaintiff to file a court
action to satisfy the period in a state statute of repose can create a
conflict between federal and state law in circumstances in which the
plaintiff has filed an administrative claim within the repose period but
cannot file a federal action in that time. Such conflicts can be
into account the filing of the required FTCA administrative claim, could bar claims
that Congress has deemed timely.").
367. See Kennedy v. U.S. Veterans Admin., 526 F. App'x 450, 459 (6th Cir. 2013) (White,
J., concurring) (stating preemption is proper where a plaintiff "files an administrative
claim within the repose period and in accordance with the deadlines set forth under §
2401(b)"); Abila v. United States, No. 2:09-CV-01345-KJD-LRL, 2011 WL 3444166,
at *5 (D. Nev. Aug. 8, 2011) (finding that a plaintiff's lawsuit was timely despite a
failure to file an action within the time set by a statute of repose "since it was filed
within six months of a final denial of its administrative claim by the Government");
Jones v. United States, 789 F. Supp. 2d 883, 892 (M.D. Tenn. 2011) (finding that a
plaintiff's claim "is extinguished only if the claimant fails to meet the deadlines in §
2401(b) and a state's statute of repose has no effect on the federal claim"). The
United States has argued that the statute of repose should apply to circumstances in
which a plaintiff could have filed a lawsuit within the repose period by deeming the
claim denied, but chose not to do so. Zander, 786 F. Supp. 2d at 886.
368. 28 u.s.c. § 2674 (2006).
369. United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 46 (2005) (citing Indian Towing Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 61, 64 (1955)).
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avoided by considering the filing of an FTCA administrative claim
with a federal agency to be analogous to the filing of an action
against a private party in state court for purposes of determining
compliance with the statute of repose. This logical interpretation
would also guard against federal agencies delaying denials of
administrative claims to allow the state statute of repose period to
expire and bar a plaintiffs action. 370
Under this interpretation, the statute of repose would bar claims
such as those in Mamea, where plaintiffs failed to file their
administrative claims with the period of the statute of repose, 371 but it
would not bar claims such as those in Zander in which a plaintiff had
filed an administrative claim within the period. Courts would reach
this result through sensible application of the FTCA's private
analogous liability rather than by looking to whether application of
the FTCA's statutes of limitations in certain circumstances presented
a conflict with operation of state statutes of repose.
Thus, in cases like Zander, in which a plaintiff filed the
administrative claim within the repose period, courts should not reach
the issue of conflict preemption. On the other hand, in cases like
Mamea, in which a plaintiff did not file an administrative within the
repose period, a court could only find a conflict justifying preemption
through an overly literal reading of the FTCA. The FTCA's
administrative exhaustion requirement allows a plaintiff who has
given the appropriate federal agency six months to consider a claim
the option to deem the claim denied at "any time thereafter" and file
an action. 372 A court could interpret that provision to allow a plaintiff
who has filed an administrative claim to file a lawsuit at literally "any
time" as long as the six months have passed and the agency has not
denied the claim. This interpretation could apply to those cases in
which an administrative claim was not filed before expiration of the
state repose period, thus presenting a conflict with the state statute
that would have precluded the action. 373 As shown in Huddleston v.
United States, 374 however, this interpretation takes the provision out
of its statutory context.
370.

Kennedy, 526 F. App'x at 458-59 (White, J., concurring) (citing this concern as a
reason for finding that the FTCA preempted state statutes of repose).
371. Mamea, 2011 WL 4371712, at *1 0 n.7 (acknowledging that the plaintiffs did not file
their administrative claims within the repose period).
372. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
373. See Zander v. United States, 786 F. Supp. 2d 880, 884 (D. Md. 2011) (recognizing
that a strict interpretation of the FTCA's "deemed denied" provision "potentially
gives a plaintiff an infinite amount of time to file suit against the Government").
374. 485 Fed. App'x. 744, 746 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 859 (2013).

2014]

Federal Law and State Statutes of Repose

195

In Huddleston, a plaintiff, who had filed an administrative claim
two months after the expiration of Tennessee's statute of repose for
malpractice actions, argued that he met the requirements of the
FTCA' s two statutes of limitations, and therefore should be allowed
to pursue his claim. 375 "The Supremacy Clause, [plaintiff argued],
does not permit Tennessee's statute of repose to trump § 2401 (b) [the
FTCA's statute of limitations]."376 The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals disagreed and considered the complete context of the FTCA
in reaching its decision. The court explained that the '"FTCA does
not create liability,'" but "'merely waives sovereign immunity to the
extent state-law would impose liability on a private individual in
similar circumstances. "'377 Because the plaintiff had filed his
administrative claim after the expiration of the applicable repose
period, Tennessee law had already "extinguished his claim.'m8 The
court stated "[b ]ecause federal law incorporates state substantive law
for the purposes of FTCA claims, applying Tennessee's statute of
repose to FTCA plaintiffs does not run afoul of the Supremacy
Clause."379 Thus, considering the FTCA as a whole, and, in
particular, its incorporation of substantive state law, the isolated
statement that a plaintiff may deem a claim denied "any time
thereafter" cannot serve to resurrect a claim that has already been
extinguished under a state statute ofrepose. 380
This interpretation is also consistent with the presumption against
preemption canon. When there is a reasonable interpretation of the
statute that does not create a conflict triggering federal preemption,
the court should adopt that interpretation, rather than using an
alternative interpretation that would require preemption.
Finally, there is nothing in the legislative history or purpose of the
FTCA reflecting a congressional intent to preempt state statutes of
repose. The FTCA' s legislative history is silent on statutes of repose
for good reason, given that a general discovery rule of accrual was
not recognized at the time of the FTCA's enactment. But, the
legislative history is clear that Congress intended to incorporate state

375. !d. at 745-46.
376. !d. at 745.
377. !d. (quoting Myers v. United States, 17 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 1994) (emphasis
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
378. !d. at 746.
379. !d.
380. This interpretation is mandated by the "whole-text" canon, which requires a court to
consider the "entire text" of a statute, "in view of its structure and of the physical and
logical relation of its many parts." SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 83, at 167.
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substantive tort law to determine the United States' liability. 381
Because statutes of repose are part of a state's evolving substantive
tort law, applying statutes of repose to FTCA actions involving the
United States is consistent with this congressional intent.
In sum, applying the interpretive approach to determine whether
the FTCA preempts state statutes of repose leads to the conclusion
that Congress did not intend to preempt state statutes of repose, but
instead intended to incorporate them to the extent they are part of a
state's substantive law. Nevertheless, applying the FTCA's private
analogous liability requirement can lead a court to conclude that
filing an FTCA administrative claim within the repose period
satisfies the state substantive requirement.
VII. CONCLUSION
Examining instances in which courts have found that federal law
preempts state statutes of repose reveals how undisciplined statutory
interpretation can run roughshod over the principle of Chesterton's
fence. States enacted statutes of repose in response to a perceived
insurance crisis created, in part, by the open-ended and uncertain tort
liability resulting from a discovery rule of accrual for statutes of
limitations. But, there is no evidence that Congress considered the
legislative purposes underlying state statutes of repose in amending
CERCLA through Section 9658 or in enacting the FTCA. With
respect to Section 9658 of CERCLA, Congress certainly recognized
that statutes of limitations without a discovery rule of accrual could
prematurely cut off causes of actions for latent injuries. Congress,
however, made no determination regarding the validity of state
statutes of repose designed to control insurance costs produced
through the "long tail" liability resulting from a discovery rule.
There was no study of the effects of a discovery rule on insurance
costs or of the efficacy of statutes of repose in controlling those costs.
381. In testimony in support of legislation which became the FTCA, Special Assistant to
the Attorney General, Alexander Holtzoff stated, "[t]his bill is, of course, limited to
those tort claims which the law would recognize as justiciable, and for which a
recovery could be had in the event that the defendant were a private individual or a
private corporation, as the bill merely waives the immunity of the United States
against being sued." Tort Claims against the United States: Hearings on S. 2690
before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. 34 (1940).
Likewise, Assistant Attorney General Francis M. Shea testified, "[t]he liability of the
United States in such cases is to be the same as that of a private individual, subject to
the limitations of the bill, and is to be determined under the local law ... Local law is
to govern not only the matter of liability but also such defenses as contributory
negligence, aggravation of damages, and the like ...." Tort Claims: Hearings on
H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 before H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 26 (1942).
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Rather, the Study Group whose report led to enactment of Section
9658 simply surveyed state statutes of limitations to determine which
states had discovery rules of accrual and which states did not, thereby
justifying the need for a "federal commencement date" where state
law failed to provide an adequate discovery rule. The Study Group
referenced statutes of repose but did not evaluate, or even
acknowledge, their purpose in recommending that states repeal them.
With respect to the FTCA, there is even less basis to justify finding
congressional intent to preempt state statutes of repose. Congress
affirmatively decided that the United States' tort liability would be
determined by the substantive tort law of the state where the tortious
act or omission occurred. Thus, Congress explicitly left policy
choices regarding the substantive parameters the United States' tort
liability to the states, subject to certain jurisdictional limitations.
Additionally, because enactment of state statutes of repose post-dated
Congress's passage of the FTCA, Congress could not have possibly
considered the benefit of those statutes in providing defendants and
the insurance industry more certainty regarding potential tort liability
(or, for that matter, the consequences of foreclosing otherwise valid
causes of action).
Following a systematic, holistic approach to determining whether
federal statutes preempt state statutes of repose is the best safeguard
for ensuring adherence to the principle of Chesterton's fence. The
approach proposed here, giving primacy to text and considering all
applicable substantive canons of construction and reliable indicators
of congressional intent, will lead to preemption of state statutes of
repose only when it is clear that preemption is what Congress
intended based on its own policy choices. This clear intent will most
likely be the result of a legislative process that considered the
benefits and the drawbacks of statutes of repose. But, as we have
seen, when a court makes the determination that federal law preempts
state statutes of repose without following a systematic approach it
risks substituting its own policy preferences for those of Congress.

